The Road to Safwan: The 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry in the 1991 ...

132 The Road to Safwan
a mortar or artillery round. Each structure had a small kerosene
burner intended to heat food, but apparently also provided the
bunker’s only source of heat. Each bunker had a rusty, five-gallon
metal can for water. The liquid inside had an oily smell and
contained bits of rust and other matter.
The two field-grade officers located what they believed to
be the unit’s kitchen facility. It was larger than most of the other
structures and contained several burner units and a container
of kerosene. Inside was a long wooden table, probably used to
prepare food, and sections of the dirt wall hollowed out for
shelving. Nearby were approximately twelve fifty-pound bags
of rice, but few of the pots, pans, and utensils that one would
find with a typical American mess section. Continuing their
search, Wimbish and Burdan also found the unit command
bunker. Inside were several old radios and various kinds of
hand microphones and headsets. The generators to run the radios
were in holes outside and connected by buried cables.
They also found several crates, with “Jordanian Army GHQ”
stenciled on them, containing radios, antennas, and other communication
equipment. They were surprised to discover this facility
because they had seen no signs of any antennas that
would normally be associated with a command post. Following
one cable from the back of a radio set to see where it would
lead, they traced it outside to a six-inch deep trench that ran for
about one hundred and fifty meters to an antenna. It was single
mast, thirty-foot pole that was lying in the open on the ground.
Three small cables, with stakes at each end, connected to the top
portion. Apparently, the Iraqis left the antenna down on the
ground except when needed. At the designated time, they
would pull on the wires, erect it, and stake it down. Once they
had completed their radio transmissions, they would then pull
the structure back down to avoid American detection. Inside
the bunker the majors found maps with operational graphics,
written in Arabic, which seemed to indicate that the squadron
now controlled the location previously occupied by the 110th
Brigade of the Iraqi 26th Infantry Division. Burdan compared
the map with the squadron intelligence template and determined
that they had done a pretty good job of targeting the actual
enemy locations. 43