The Road to Safwan: The 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry in the 1991 ...

54 The Road to Safwan
tion, COL Mowery thought it best to consolidate all of his helicopters
to get the best use of his maintenance assets, especially
his supporting AVIM (aviation intermediate maintenance)
company, and to simplify support to and from the division. Of
course, Wilson was not happy about this since it meant that his
aviators would be living away from the ground troops in the
squadron assembly area.
Later in the morning, Wilson and Burdan drove to the
squadron’s future location twenty kilometers away. Although
they had all seen pictures of the northern desert, they were surprised
at how flat and featureless the terrain was. As operations
officer, Burdan was responsible for combat plans and was concerned
by the lack of any kind of key terrain on which to anchor
the defense of the assembly area. It was obvious they would
have to prepare dug-in fighting positions if they were to have
any kind of cover and concealment in the assembly area.
The return trip to port was every bit as difficult as the trip
out. The roads were crowded and the lines at the refueling
point on Tapline Road were long. Later that night, after discussing
the situation with his staff, Wilson decided to send Burdan
back to the desert with an advance party to establish Camp
Mackenzie. The commander and MAJ Wimbish would remain
in the Ad Dammam area to attend to their first priority: getting
everything off the ships and the soldiers issued with their new
tanks and Bradleys. Wilson directed Burdan to organize the assembly
area as one large perimeter, with the squadron’s command
post in the center. As more platoons and crews arrived,
they would continue to expand this circle until it resembled a
large wagon wheel. This “circle the wagons” defense was the
best in an uncertain situation when all-around defense, especially
against raids or small unit attacks, was important.
Early on January 6, the S3 led his convoy of fifteen vehicles
from the port. Lieutenants Thomas Karns and Blaise Liess, both
platoon leaders, controlled the B Troop contingent while CPT
John (Jack) Maloney, the HHT executive officer, supervised the
headquarters soldiers. Not wishing to be at the mercy of an unfamiliar
distribution system, they brought along three 2,500gallon
HEMTT (Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck) fuel
trucks. This was a good move since they later discovered the of-