The Road to Safwan: The 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry in the 1991 ...

Objective Norfolk 135
earlier, had the squadron returning to division operational control
and leading its advance from its current location, northeast
to an area just behind the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment. On
order, the division would then conduct a forward passage of
lines and fight the Iraqi forces around Objective Norfolk. As
Burdan and the squadron staff pulled out the contingency
plan’s map overlay, all were amazed at the distance they were
now going to have to travel. It was over 100 kilometers just to
link up with the 2nd Cavalry and then another twenty to thirty
kilometers of fighting to secure their objective. It was now also
obvious the squadron did not have enough 1:250,000 maps. 4
At the division meeting, LTC Wilson had learned that the
VII Corps had encountered little resistance as it continued to
plunge into the Iraqi desert and it appeared that the Iraqis
might not yet be aware that they were about to be trapped inside
Kuwait. The 1st and 3rd Armored Divisions and the 2nd
Armored Cavalry Regiment were continuing toward the expected
location of the Republican Guard Forces Command,
around Phase Line Smash. LTG Franks designated the 1st Infantry
Division as the corps reserve and ordered it to move to
the northeast. The division staff could provide almost no information
as to the enemy situation, the friendly situation on either
flank, or where the VII Corps would make contact with the
Iraqi main force. Remaining flexible, MG Rhame planned to
move the 1st Infantry Division in two columns, with the 1st
Brigade on the left (north) and the 3rd Brigade on the right. The
2nd Brigade, without Task Force 2-16 Infantry, which Rhame
wanted left in the breach area for security, would follow the 3rd
Brigade. The cavalry’s mission was to conduct a zone reconnaissance
in front of the division main body, and to report and
then bypass any pockets of enemy resistance. The division’s
movement would begin at 0500 hours the next morning.
Wilson departed the division command post at 1700 hours
and radioed back to the tactical operation center to have the
troop commanders and staff ready for an orders-group briefing
at 2000 hours. He arrived back at the TOC at 1730 hours and met
with his staff. After a quick mission and course of action analysis
discussion, he issued his guidance for the squadron order.
Wilson planned to use the air and ground scouts together to find