The Road to Safwan: The 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry in the 1991 ...

142 The Road to Safwan
squadrons with its supporting artillery that were locked in battle
with several Iraqi brigades. This time there were no rehearsals.
At precisely the right points in the desert, the passing
units needed to move through the lines of the exhausted cavalry
troopers, turn their gun tubes towards the enemy and continue
the battle. Simultaneously, all artillery systems within
range would come under the control of the 1st Infantry. As the
brigades of the 1st Infantry Division, “Devil” (1st), “Iron
Deuce” (3rd), and “Dagger” (2nd), passed forward into enemy
contact, the 2nd Armored Cavalry would stop shooting. From
that point on, the regiment could only engage targets it positively
identified. Any mistakes in either the approach, passage,
or battle hand-off would spell disaster. 20
To preclude engaging each other by mistake, and to minimize
the natural friction of an operation to be conducted at
night by tired soldiers, the leadership of both units tried to conduct
the operation by the book. It was, however, a hasty passage,
with little time for all of the procedures spelled out in the
army’s field manuals. Friction, the cumulative effect of tired
soldiers and leaders, darkness, great distance and little time, began
to interfere with the operation. The original plan had envisioned
Wilson’s squadron making the appropriate coordination,
and then leading the 1st and 3rd Brigades forward
through the designated passage lane. However, the line of contact
between the regiment and the Iraqis was fluid. Although
the 2rd Armored Cavalry was on the 70 Easting when the 1st
Infantry Division started moving towards them, it ended up
closer to the 73 Easting and in contact with at least two more
Tawakalna battalions as the actual time for the passage approached.
Furthermore, Rhame had second thoughts about trying
to fit his relatively light cavalry squadron between the 2nd
Armored Cavalry and the defending Iraqi armor. Once the
squadron led the 1st and 3rd Brigades to the passage lanes, the
brigades would then have to pass through the regiment to
bring their firepower to bear on the enemy. Essentially, it would
have been a double forward passage in the face of the enemy.
Therefore, keeping with the American Army’s adage of KISS
(“Keep It Simple, Stupid”), Rhame directed the two brigades to
pass directly through the regiment in the passage lanes coordi-