The Road to Safwan: The 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry in the 1991 ...

84 The Road to Safwan
leaders believed it was a mistake by the crew. However, as CPT
Morrison and CSM Cobb continued their investigation, it became
obvious that other squadron Bradleys were having the
same problem. The CSM, an experienced soldier who had
taught gunnery at Fort Knox, contacted a civilian Bradley technician
who happened to be in the squadron area that day. Of
course, this manufacturer’s representative was convinced it
was crew error and there was no need for further investigation.
Cobb persisted, and pointed out that it would be bad public relations
if the media were to discover that soldiers were going to
war with defective equipment. After that remark, the representative
decided to investigate and discovered almost half of the
squadron’s new Bradley Fighting Vehicles had defective missile
circuit boards! Within a short time, the manufacturer, who now
had a sense of urgency, located new boards and installed them
in the defective vehicles. 7
One of the less successful aspects of this phase was the use
of the division’s Long Range Surveillance Detachment, or LRSD,
which arrived in the sector after the corps detachment departed.
In theory, it worked for and reported to the intelligence section
(G2) back at division main command post. As in the case of the
corps unit, it was supposed to conduct independent reconnaissance
and surveillance missions. Its soldiers were supposed to
move stealthily to hidden observation posts well forward of the
friendly security zone. There, these small teams would remain,
motionless, observing enemy activity. Then at the appointed
time, the division would extract them surreptitiously and return
them for a debriefing by the intelligence specialists. However, it
did not work out quite that way. Because the division commander
was concerned about taking needless casualties, its employment
was not as bold as the original doctrine writers had
envisioned. Rather than establishing posts beyond the view of
the forward screen line, the teams were within the observation
and direct-fire weapons range of CC Carter. This conservative
employment created a number of problems. First, the staff chose
to use the cavalry squadron for team insertion and recovery, essentially
displaying increased activity for observant Iraqi units
who would have little problem identifying helicopters and
American vehicles. More important from the task force’s per-