The Road to Safwan: The 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry in the 1991 ...

Operations in the TAA 57
leader, 2LT Nathan T. Butler, squadron surgeon MAJ Roger
Hanson, personnel officer CPT Theodore K. (Ken) Stokes, Jr.,
and the squadron mail clerk went out to visit the division support
command several kilometers away. They did not return
that night. The next morning, having spent the night with another
unit, they returned to the TOC complaining about their
GPS. Of course, the device was fine. However, the division
learned that there were periods of time when the satellite coverage
was not sufficient to provide accurate GPS readings. 4
It was becoming obvious to all that war was right around
the corner. The first indication of danger came in the early
evening of January 9. A little before 2100 hours a huge fireball
lit up the pitch-black sky. Something had exploded about six
kilometers south of the squadron’s headquarters. Without being
told, soldiers grabbed their protective masks and put on
their chemical protective over-garments. Those soldiers assigned
detection responsibilities broke open their kits and began
to sample the air. Soon it was confirmed that that the air
was clear and the troops were able to relax. MAJ Wimbish was
on Tapline Road when the explosion took place and he and his
driver, SPC Christopher Harper, put on their protective masks.
Once they got their bearings and determined that they were not
under any kind of continuous attack, they headed in the direction
of the fireball. They were first on the scene, and found aircraft
wreckage all over the area. Soon Air Force security police
arrived and secured the wreckage. For whatever reason, a lowflying
F-16 Fighting Falcon had hit the ground at high speed. It
was an early reminder that, to quote Dorothy’s famous line
from the Wizard of Oz, which was appropriate for soldiers from
Fort Riley, “we’re not in Kansas anymore.” 5
Simultaneously with the build-up of combat power, the
squadron began preparing for war. Given the activity across its
border, it was reasonable to expect that the Iraqi Army might
launch a preemptive attack on Saudi Arabia and the VII Corps’s
growing combat power. On January 10 the 1st Infantry Division
ordered the squadron, still missing most of its Bradleys and
tanks, to go to a war footing and begin operating the tactical operations
center twenty-four hours a day. Along with the rest of
the corps, the squadron conducted a “stand-to” each morning.