The Road to Safwan: The 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry in the 1991 ...
The Road to Safwan: The 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry in the 1991 ...
The Road to Safwan: The 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry in the 1991 ...
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<strong>The</strong> Basra Highway 167<br />
2nd Brigade as well. By 1600 hours, LTC Wilson realized he was<br />
out of contact with <strong>the</strong> rest of <strong>the</strong> Big Red One. 22 Wilson now<br />
faced one of those decisions that are reserved for those <strong>in</strong> command.<br />
He had essentially two options. First, he could hold his<br />
position and try <strong>to</strong> rega<strong>in</strong> contact with his senior commanders,<br />
plann<strong>in</strong>g on accomplish<strong>in</strong>g his mission once he had received<br />
more <strong>in</strong>formation on <strong>the</strong> division’s progress. Or, he could take<br />
advantage of <strong>the</strong> breakdown <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Iraqi’s defenses and cont<strong>in</strong>ue<br />
<strong>to</strong> his orig<strong>in</strong>al objective, assum<strong>in</strong>g that <strong>the</strong> rest of <strong>the</strong> division<br />
would follow shortly <strong>the</strong>reafter.<br />
Wilson and Burdan, unaware of <strong>the</strong> confusion at <strong>the</strong>ir senior<br />
headquarters, assumed that <strong>the</strong> division would catch up<br />
with <strong>the</strong>m shortly. As <strong>the</strong>y cont<strong>in</strong>ued <strong>the</strong>ir advance <strong>to</strong>wards<br />
Objective Denver, <strong>the</strong> leaders sketched out <strong>the</strong>ir plan of action.<br />
<strong>The</strong>y needed <strong>to</strong> accomplish two tasks: cut <strong>the</strong> Basra Highway,<br />
as Rhame had <strong>in</strong>structed, and cont<strong>in</strong>ue <strong>to</strong> protect <strong>the</strong> division’s<br />
nor<strong>the</strong>rn flank, <strong>in</strong> case <strong>the</strong> Iraqi army attempted <strong>to</strong> counterattack<br />
from <strong>the</strong> north. Wilson gave A Troop <strong>the</strong> mission of cutt<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>the</strong> Basra Highway, while B Troop would stretch out on l<strong>in</strong>e <strong>to</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> west for approximately ten kilometers <strong>to</strong> block any approach<br />
from <strong>the</strong> north. 23<br />
<strong>The</strong> squadron commander discussed his options with Burdan<br />
and his two ground troop commanders. <strong>The</strong>y were all<br />
comfortable with <strong>the</strong>ir mission, knew <strong>the</strong>y could reestablish<br />
contact by send<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>ir helicopters south, and assumed that<br />
<strong>the</strong> rema<strong>in</strong>der of <strong>the</strong> division was on its way. It was obvious <strong>to</strong><br />
all that organized Iraqi resistance had evaporated. <strong>The</strong> aeroscouts<br />
reported no mean<strong>in</strong>gful enemy activity <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> area and<br />
no organized units with<strong>in</strong> ten kilometers of <strong>the</strong> squadron. Of<br />
course, cavalrymen by nature are not <strong>in</strong>cl<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>to</strong> wait, and <strong>the</strong><br />
aggressive Wilson was anxious <strong>to</strong> accomplish his mission.<br />
<strong>The</strong>refore, he ordered his commanders <strong>to</strong> cont<strong>in</strong>ue <strong>to</strong>wards <strong>the</strong><br />
highway where <strong>the</strong>y would wait for <strong>the</strong> arrival of <strong>the</strong> rest of <strong>the</strong><br />
Big Red One. <strong>The</strong>y approached <strong>the</strong> nor<strong>the</strong>rn edge of Objective<br />
Denver around 1630 hours, thus cutt<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> Basra Highway<br />
and accomplish<strong>in</strong>g Rhame’s promise <strong>to</strong> LTG Franks. 24<br />
As B Troop arrived on its objective at 1630, it moved <strong>to</strong> establish<br />
a th<strong>in</strong> screen-l<strong>in</strong>e stretch<strong>in</strong>g west start<strong>in</strong>g about eight<br />
kilometers west of <strong>the</strong> highway. CPT Roy Peters, <strong>the</strong> D Troop