The Road to Safwan: The 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry in the 1991 ...

204 The Road to Safwan
The context of this entire time period, in addition to the behind-the-scenes
peace negotiations, was the Shi’a uprising in
southern Iraq. Although many of the details remain obscure, it
began at the end of February, as a protest by regular army soldiers
southwest of Al Basra. Apparently, they believed Saddam
Hussein and his Republican Guards had abandoned them during
the retreat from Kuwait. This protest then sparked a spontaneous,
leaderless demonstration of Shi’a Iraqis frustrated
with the regime. Mobs broke open the jails and went on a
killing rampage against all symbols of the Iraqi government,
and soon cities such as Al Zubayr, An Nasiriyah, As Samawah,
An Najaf, and Karbella were all involved in heavy fighting. 4
The rebellion began to fall apart almost immediately. Shi’a
radicals took over its leadership and began circulating photographs
of Iran’s Ayatollah Khomeini. Consequently, moderates,
the army, nationalists, and others who could have been instrumental
in breaking with the Baghdad government deserted the
dissidents’ cause. While the revolt caught Hussein’s government
off-guard, the regime soon recovered. It reconstituted the
army, especially the survivors of Republican Guard units, and
began a brutal program to destroy all involved. Often, these
forces conducted operations in full view of coalition troops, just
across the military demarcation line. American soldiers watched
as Iraqi tank and helicopter units attacked Shi’a strongholds, in
some cases using the chemical weapons they never employed
against the coalition forces. 5
President George H. W. Bush had decided not to participate
in this fight, and prohibited United States military units from
intervening. Emotionally, American officers would have relished
the chance to inflict punishment on Hussein’s vindictive
troops. However, any overt action could find the U.S. Army engaged
in a civil war whose length, cost, and outcome was uncertain.
The United States would have gone into Iraq alone
since most of the coalition would not have followed. Iran might
have intervened on one side or another, further complicating
the situation. It was a road down which the United States government
did not wish to travel in 1991. The events following the
defeat of the Iraqi Army in 2003 have confirmed the logic of that
hesitation, as the shine of that victory wore off as American and