The Road to Safwan: The 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry in the 1991 ...

7 Combat Command
Carter
Even before Wilson asked for help, MG
Rhame was discussing the situation with
the corps commander. The battle at Khafji at
the end of January and numerous reports of Iraqi movements
since, caused the generals to reconsider the security arrangements
for the corps logistics base. Certainly, a similar effort near
the Wadi al Batin could have disastrous consequences. 1 From a
tactical perspective, the 1-4 Cavalry was beyond American artillery
support and would be unable to stop a determined Iraqi
raid on the growing logistics installation. The recent Iraqi troop
movements opposite the squadron suggested either possible
Iraqi probes or an improvement of their defensive positioning
along the border. Either way, it was essential to change the nature
of the operation and improve the corps’s defensive posture
in this critical sector. Therefore, on January 31, Rhame issued
orders to form a small brigade task force under his Assistant Division
Commander for Maneuver (ADC-M), Brigadier General
(BG) William G. Carter III. Called Combat Command (CC)
Carter, it would assume command authority for the sector and
add additional combat power to the security force. 2
LTC David Gross’s Task Force (TF) 3rd Battalion, 37th Armor;
LTC Harry Emerson’s 1st Battalion, 5th Field Artillery;
and the division’s tactical command post or DTAC would join
the Quarter Horse on the line. 3 With this ad hoc command,
Carter’s mission was to conduct security operations to protect
DSA Junction City and screen the movement of the division’s
maneuver brigades into the sector. As part of this organization,
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