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Sobibor - Holocaust Propaganda And Reality - Unity of Nobility ...

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208 J. GRAF, T. KUES, C. MATTOGNO, SOBIBÓR<br />

According to a note <strong>of</strong> the Reich chancellery dating from March or<br />

April <strong>of</strong> 1942, Hitler had repeatedly informed Lammers, the head <strong>of</strong> the<br />

chancellery, “that he wanted to postpone the solution <strong>of</strong> the Jewish<br />

question until after the war.” 607 On 24 July 1942, according to Henry<br />

Picker, Hitler underlined this intention by saying squarely that “he<br />

would, after the end <strong>of</strong> the war, take the rigorous stand <strong>of</strong> squeezing one<br />

city after another until the Jews came out, ready to emigrate to Madagascar<br />

or to some other Jewish national state.” 608<br />

The intention <strong>of</strong> the National Socialists to solve the Jewish problem<br />

after the war results also from the so-called “Brown File” drafted by<br />

Rosenberg on 20 June 1941 and later integrated into the “Green File” <strong>of</strong><br />

September <strong>of</strong> 1942. Its section “Directives for the treatment <strong>of</strong> the Jewish<br />

question” begins as follows: 609<br />

“All measures regarding to the Jewish question in the occupied<br />

territories in the East must be taken from the point <strong>of</strong> view that the<br />

Jewish question will be solved in a general way for the whole <strong>of</strong> Europe<br />

after the war. They must, therefore, be conceived as preparatory<br />

partial measures and must be in agreement with other decisions<br />

in this domain. On the other hand, the experience gathered in connection<br />

with the treatment <strong>of</strong> the Jewish question in the occupied<br />

eastern territories may have a bearing on the solution <strong>of</strong> the problem<br />

as a whole, as the Jews in these territories, together with those<br />

<strong>of</strong> the General Government, constitute the largest contingent <strong>of</strong> European<br />

Jewry. Any kind <strong>of</strong> purely vexatious actions, being unworthy<br />

<strong>of</strong> a German, are to be abstained from.”<br />

In a typed copy <strong>of</strong> these “Directives,” undated but surely stemming<br />

from the same period, the text continues as follows after the word ‘domain’:<br />

610<br />

“This is applicable, in particular, to the creation <strong>of</strong> at least temporary<br />

facilities for the settlement <strong>of</strong> Jews from the territory <strong>of</strong> the<br />

Reich.”<br />

A note by Martin Luther, an <strong>of</strong>ficial in the Ministry <strong>of</strong> Foreign Affairs,<br />

referring to Jews <strong>of</strong> Spanish nationality living in occupied France<br />

607<br />

608<br />

609<br />

610<br />

PS-4025.<br />

Henry Picker, Hitlers Tischgespräche im Führerhauptquartier, Wilhelm Goldmann Verlag,<br />

Munich 1981, p. 456.<br />

“Richtlinien für die Führung der Wirtschaft in den besetzten Ostgebieten” (Directives for<br />

the Management <strong>of</strong> the Economy in the occupied eastern territories) (Green File), Berlin,<br />

September 1942. EC-347. IMT, vol. XXXVI, p. 348.<br />

PS-212. IMT, vol. XXV, p. 302

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