02.11.2013 Views

Sobibor - Holocaust Propaganda And Reality - Unity of Nobility ...

Sobibor - Holocaust Propaganda And Reality - Unity of Nobility ...

Sobibor - Holocaust Propaganda And Reality - Unity of Nobility ...

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.

J. GRAF, T. KUES, C. MATTOGNO, SOBIBÓR 231<br />

“Aly concluded that there was no single, specific decision to kill<br />

the Jews <strong>of</strong> Europe. Rather, analogous to Mommsen’s notion <strong>of</strong> a<br />

system <strong>of</strong> cumulative radicalization, he posited a long and complex<br />

process <strong>of</strong> decision-making, with notable spurts in March, July, and<br />

October 1941, but continuing still as a series <strong>of</strong> experiments down to<br />

May 1942. Hitler’s role, according to this interpretation, was confined<br />

to decisions as an arbiter between competing Nazi leaders<br />

whose own schemes to deal with the Jewish question had created insoluble<br />

problems.”<br />

Other studies linked the alleged exterminations to decisions taken by<br />

local authorities, but “the role <strong>of</strong> Hitler, too, seemed scarcely to figure<br />

in the new explanations. Was it likely, or plausible, that the most radical<br />

<strong>of</strong> radical anti-Semites had played no direct part in shaping the policies<br />

aimed at destroying his perceived arch-enemy?” 662<br />

David Bankier (1988) and Saul Friedländer (1997) had shown that<br />

during the 1930s Hitler had been more active in anti-Jewish politics<br />

than was believed earlier and that it was therefore difficult to accept that<br />

he would later stay out <strong>of</strong> the decisional process leading to the alleged<br />

genocide.<br />

In 1994 Browning maintained the importance <strong>of</strong> the Führerbefehl,<br />

which he dated to the summer <strong>of</strong> 1941, stressing that, in this way, he<br />

“was not positing a single decision, but envisaging the point at which<br />

Hitler inaugurated the decision-making process, the first move in developments<br />

that would stretch over the subsequent months.” 662<br />

In 1991 Richard Breitman “dated ‘a fundamental decision to exterminate<br />

the Jews’ by the dictator to as early as January 1941, adding,<br />

however, that ‘if the goal and basic policies were now clear, the specific<br />

plans were not,’ and followed only after some time with the first operational<br />

decisions in July,” something which Kershaw himself believes to<br />

be unsustainable. 663<br />

Against this Kershaw summarizes Tobias Jersak as stating in 1999<br />

that “the declaration <strong>of</strong> the Atlantic Charter by Roosevelt and Churchill<br />

on August 14, 1941 (meaning that Germany would soon be at war with<br />

the USA) was the trigger for Hitler, suffering at that point from a nervous<br />

collapse and reeling from the recognition <strong>of</strong> the failure <strong>of</strong> his strategy<br />

to defeat the Soviet Union, to take the fundamental decision that the<br />

Jews <strong>of</strong> Europe should be physically destroyed.” But Kershaw states<br />

662<br />

663<br />

Ibid., p. 21.<br />

Ibid., p. 21f.

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!