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222 J. GRAF, T. KUES, C. MATTOGNO, SOBIBÓR
“The taxes on emigration certainly went up continually, but at
the same time the RSHA tried to soften the foreign exchange controls.
In spite of all official regulations, it eventually obtained the
employment of Jews in the agricultural sector ‘in order to ease their
emigration by providing them with a professional education.’ The
RSHA also managed to lower or to do away with all sorts of special
taxes and limits on the export of capital. In December of 1940 they
succeeded in convincing the Ministry of the Economy to accelerate
the financial procedures in all cases of emigration against all regulations
in force. This search for a global solution of the ‘Jewish
question’ can still be found in the attempt by the RSHA to obtain a
general directive for emigration from Göring. Later on this document
[645] would often be misinterpreted because of its wording.
Göring ordered all Reich authorities to facilitate the emigration of
Jews away from the Reich and the territories under protection to the
extent possible, even in wartime. On the other hand, the emigration
of Jews from France and Belgium was to be prohibited on account
of the ‘final solution, which was doubtlessly drawing near.’ This seductive
term ‘final solution’ was interpreted by generations of historians
as to mean the physical destruction, whereas, at that time, it
meant only the emigration of the Jews to Madagascar. The trap
closed only in August of 1941. The RSHA prohibited the emigration
of able-bodied Jews. [646] At the end of August 1941 Eichmann extended
this regulation to all Jews who lived in areas occupied by
Germany. On 23 October 1941 the RSHA informed all units of the
police and the SD of an order issued by Himmler which stopped any
Jewish emigration whatsoever, without exception, for the duration of
the war.” (Emph. added)
Christopher R. Browning took up the specific topic of the decision
concerning the alleged genocide. He underlined above all the “major
divergences” which divided the two Holocaust interpretations at the
time: 647 “The decision concerning the final solution has been the subject
of a large number of historical interpretations. The essential diver-
645
646
647
W. Schellenberg’s letter dated 20 May 1941. Document NG-3104.
Eichmann’s order concerened actually the Jews “fit for military service” (wehrfähig) and
was obviously meant to keep the enemy from obtaining potential soldiers. Joseph Walk
(ed.), Das Sonderrecht für die Juden im NS-Staat, C.F. Müller Juristischer Verlag, Heidelberg-Karlsruhe
1981, n. 227, p. 347.
Ibid., p. 190.