Towards a Baltic Sea Region Strategy in Critical ... - Helsinki.fi

CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION IN THE BALTIC SEA REGION
the fire stations. Due to the large number of assignments, the rescue authorities
were constantly required to evaluate and prioritize them, in order to prevent
duplicate visits to the same location and maintain preparedness for handling urgent
emergencies. As the officer in charge could have more than 20 simultaneous
requests for assistance to deal with, the line had to be drawn somewhere. Urgent
assignments had the highest priority, clearing trees from traffic routes came next.
Overall, clearing assignments were carried out only if they caused immediate
danger to life or property.
The power lines were mainly cleared by the power companies themselves. If
assistance was requested from the fire departments, it was only granted if enough
rescue resources were available.
The majority of the rescue assignments during these two storms concerned
fallen trees and other debris, damaged roofs, collapsed constructions and drifting
boats. The fire departments also delivered generators to high-risk farms and real
estate owners. For example, a nursing home for elderly people was assisted in
maintaining their heating and lighting in Pylkönmäki.
Communication
During the storms, about 24 000 customers were affected by interruptions in the
fixed telephone network, of which the longest lasted for about ten days. The
failures were mainly caused by trees over the telephone lines or power shortage in
switches due to insufficient backup power.
The mobile telephone network also suffered from interruptions; about
250 000 customers were affected. Although the downtime of the mobile telephone
network was significantly smaller compared to the fixed telephone network, some
base stations remained out of order for about six days. The interruptions were
caused by power shortage in base stations, as the batteries were not dimensioned
for blackouts of this magnitude. Backup power generators were either not
available at all, or they could only be delivered to the most important base
stations. Another problem that arose was the inability for the customers to recharge
the batteries in their mobile phones.
In Finland all safety and security authorities use a common nation-wide
authority radio network called VIRVE, which is based on the TETRA (Terrestial
Trunk Radio) standard.
At the time of the ‘Pyry’ and ‘Janika’ storms, the transition from the old
analogue radio systems to TETRA was in progress; thus all vehicles were also
equipped with the old radio terminals.
During the storms, tens of VIRVE base stations failed, resulting in a
complete loss of the network services in some areas. This again endangered or
prevented dispatching of units, intra-organizational coordination and
interoperability between authorities.
The primary reasons for the failure were that either the base stations
themselves or the routing systems between the base stations and the network ran
out of power. Most base stations were equipped with backup batteries, but with
insufficient capacity.
Fortunately, the old radio networks were still operational and hence allowed
the rescue units to carry out their duties.
68 NORDREGIO REPORT 2007:5