Towards a Baltic Sea Region Strategy in Critical ... - Helsinki.fi

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CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION IN THE BALTIC SEA REGION from December 2006 (still in process when writing this), a terrorism-as-priority approach was adopted, at least in the document’s introductory words: “In December 2005 the Justice and Home Affairs Council called upon the Commission to make a proposal for a European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection (EPCIP) and decided that it should be based on an all-hazards approach while countering threats from terrorism as a priority. Under this approach, manmade, technological threats and natural disasters should be taken into account in the critical infrastructure protection process, but the threat of terrorism should be given priority. If the level of protection measures against a particular high level threat is found to be adequate in a critical infrastructure sector, stakeholders should concentrate on other threats to which they are still vulnerable.” (Commission 2006a, p. 13) 23 However, the decision mentioned here was taken already in December 2005, that is, less than a month after the Green Paper was offered for comment, and it seems that the priorities do not necessarily reflect the viewpoints of all the stakeholders. In fact, in the proposed Directive articles terrorism is not prioritised so strongly and the concept of ‘threat’ for instance is defined as “any indication, circumstance, or event with the potential to disrupt or destroy critical infrastructure, or any element thereof” (Commission 2006a, p. 16). If we look this issue from the perspective of the BSR, it seems clear that while the Member States are committed to the EU’s anti-terrorism policies, and some Member States more than others even to the US-declared ‘war on terror’, the above quoted Commission statement – “manmade, technological threats and natural disasters should be taken into account in the critical infrastructure protection process, but the threat of terrorism should be given priority” – seems not to suit BSR conditions, whereas the Directive Proposal’s above quoted approach – “any indication, circumstance, or event” – would fit much better. Deliberate threats to CI or CII, individual non-political violent acts and sabotage, criminal behaviour and organised crime, or politically motivated riots or protests that threaten public order or law, are today much more the reality in the BSR than terrorism. In fact, so far, no one has died in a modern terrorist attack in the Baltic Sea Region, although some of the countries included have suffered from terrorism In all probability terrorism will arrive in the region at some point – indeed, as recently as September 2007 several people were arrested in Denmark suspected of planning terrorist attacks – but its effects on individual citizens’ security as well as CI will likely be minimal compared to other threats. 24 23 Italics added by the author of this Introduction. 24 Indeed, should we compare terrorism to other external causes of death, we see that every year, more than five million people worldwide die as a result of some kind of injury in every-day accidents, most of which could be avoided. This accounts for nine percent of all deaths, placing injuries in the top three causes of death. In the European region injuries cause about 800 000 deaths annually. Looking at the BSR in particular, we notice that in each country thousands of deaths are caused annually by injuries in the form of different type of accidents. Moreover, for every death due to injuries there are hundreds, if not thousands, of individuals who are either hospitalised or treated in hospital emergency rooms or other healthcare facilities due to their injury. Many of these injured people suffer long-term or permanent disabilities. In addition to all 30 NORDREGIO REPORT 2007:5
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION Especially CII must be constantly protected against sabotage, criminal activities and politically motivated attacks – and without a simple virus firewall any ICT system would collapse within hours because of deliberate attacks, as is discussed in Chapter III. However, the main threats to CI in general in the BSR are non-intentional, such as technological disturbances, natural catastrophes, human failures and so forth. Chapter II shows very clearly how vulnerable the electricity grid, and through that all other vital functions of society, is in the BSR especially under extreme weather conditions. Chapter IV discusses oil transportation and maritime safety, and demonstrates how hard winter ice conditions, increasing traffic volumes, human and technological failures and other non-deliberate threats form the basis of realistic risk analysis, even if the possibility of terrorism remains a low-probability risk. Also Chapter V, dealing with the North European Gas Pipeline, identifies threats that are much more plausible than terrorism, although it cannot be completely excluded. Chapter VI on ground water availability shows that one of the main climate change related consequence, namely sea water-level rise, has a direct effect on ground water aquifers in the coastal areas of the Baltic Sea. Hence the study’s case studies support the all-hazards approach to CIP, if the CIP strategy is made on the basis of well-founded risk analysis based on facts and experiencies from the BSR. This would not be the same as neglecting the threat of terrorism. Terrorism is a very peculiar kind of threat in several ways as it challenges the state and society in the same intentional spirit as does war. Its most important feature from the CIP point of view in the BSR context is that while it is a low-probability risk, it at worst can have a huge negative impact in terms of losses. The worst-case scenarios of terrorism – say a large scale nuclear, biological or chemical attack – should direct the preparation, in the same way as one has to be prepared for a low-probabilistic but potentially extremely harmful technological nuclear catastrophe. From the perspective of the vital functions to the society it is however not rational to put all the efforts to prevent low-probabilistic emergencies and hazards. 1.5 FROM PROTECTION TO RESILIENCE? 25 Especially the Nordic countries seem to base their approaches on securing functionality rather than on protecting individual infrastructures; the current view of CIP in the EU emphasizes the protection of infrastructures and prevention of disturbances, such as disasters, and relatively little attention is paid to recovering this human suffering, injuries are the cause of a major loss of human resources and productivity posing a great social and economic burden on society. The treatment and rehabilitation of injured persons often accounts for a large proportion of national or local health budgets. Though the total cost of injuries for any society is difficult to calculate a number of estimation methods to this effect do however exist. Thus in Sweden, for instance, it has been calculated that the annual cost, to society, caused by injuries is about 5 Million euros per 10 000 inhabitants. (Eurobaltic Guidelines 2007) 25 This section is based on Jyrki Landstedt’s and Petter Holmström’s somewhat shorter analysis, which originally was part of Chapter II of this volume; see Landstedt and Holmström (2007). NORDREGIO REPORT 2007:5 31
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CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION
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