Towards a Baltic Sea Region Strategy in Critical ... - Helsinki.fi

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CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION IN THE BALTIC SEA REGION Analysis of the underlying concepts The analysis of typology and potential scenarios for CII threats (and related concepts) provides the foundation for a comprehensive study of CIIP. This analysis is performed here with the aid of concept maps that make use of a graphical nodearc representation of relationships among a collection of concepts. In concept maps, the concepts are usually represented as nodes enclosed in boxes and then interrelated concepts are then linked using lines with descriptive labels or phrases written over them. These linking phrases specify the relationship between the related concepts. Concept maps are now increasingly used in a diverse range of sectors to articulate and visualize the complex internalities and externalities of various processes. 48 Notably, concept maps are now also considered as one of the important tools for communicating technical ideas and concepts in the ICT development process (Siau and Tan 2005). Figure III—3 High-level concept map depicting various aspects of threats on CII. 48 For example, a large collection of concept maps produced by the NASA’s Center for Mars Exploration (CMEX) detailing various aspects of Mars exploration are available for public viewing (CEMEX 2007). 88 NORDREGIO REPORT 2007:5
CHAPTER III: INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY A concept map originating from the concept of threats on a CII would be rather large and cumbersome to depict with sufficient clarity on a single integrated map. Therefore, a high-level concept map representing only the major concepts (the nominal ‘view from 50,000 feet’) can be seen in Figure 3. The map is derived from an extensive survey of standardization documents (ITU-T X.800 and RFC 2828), technical notes from industry (Gordon 2003; Albert et al 2003), general scientific literature (Stallings 2003, Rozenblit 2000, Vacca 2006, Yoo 2005) and a multitude of online material. It is clear from Figure 3 that threats to CII are attributed to a range of factors that exploit system vulnerabilities and if realized will result in any of a possible set of consequences to the system. Further explanation of these initial observations is provided in the subsequent subsections with the aid of detailed low-level concept maps. Consequences of Threats The successful realization of a threat on a CII would result in at least one of the following outcomes: • The destruction of information, system assets or resources. • The corruption or modification of information. • The theft, removal or loss of information, system assets or resources. • The undesired or unauthorized disclosure of information. • The interruption of service delivery. The methods or action leading to each threat consequence may vary, as illustrated in Figure 4. Destruction, removal or interruption could potentially lead to the partial or complete failure of the system to function and provide intended services. This, for example, could be the result of the physical destruction of a main switching centre that weakens the ability to exchange information between geographically distant areas, or a prolonged denial-of-service (DoS) attack that illegally consumes limited system resources and makes an asset (e.g., website, server etc.) unavailable. Distributed DoS (DDoS) attacks are even more intense, as they use multiple compromised systems or zombies to launch simultaneous attacks on a target system. On the contrary, corruption, disclosure or removal of information may not directly lead to system failure, but may enable unauthorized access to system data that could be used to launch more severe attacks on the system, comprise operations of organizations relying on the system (e.g. leakage of information from a military network revealing troops positioning), or even as part of a more sinister plot. For example, it is believed that the bombers behind the 2004 attack on the Madrid commuter train had planned their attack using fraudulent telephone calls made by hacking in to a telephone exchange (a practice commonly known as ‘phreaking’) belonging to a bank in France (Pollard 2005). NORDREGIO REPORT 2007:5 89
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Towards a Baltic Sea Region Strateg
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Nordregio Report 2007:5 ISSN 1403-2
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5.4 Impacts caused by terrorism, na
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CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION
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PREFACE PREFACE With the Commission
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PREFACE The study includes tens of
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION CHAPTER I:
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CHAPTER V: GAS CHAPTER V: GAS Sven
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CHAPTER VI: WATER CHAPTER VI: WATER
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