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CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION IN THE BALTIC SEA REGION infrastructure that links research and higher education institutions across several countries in the region. Similarly, multinational firms in the ICT sector, such as the telecom operator TeliaSonera AB, now own infrastructure and/or have operations that span several BSR countries. These developments accelerate the need for matching regional CIIP efforts that also serve to complement the CIIP strategies being planned or implemented at a national level. The regional CIIP efforts could be based on the recognition of the commonality of risks (vulnerabilities, threats and assets) and the potential escalation or cascading of regional disruptions within the BSR - the cyber-crime incidents targeting customers of Nordea bank across the region, being one of many existing examples. Furthermore, regional efforts could be built on the potential of the extra value accrued by having robust regional CII, which translates into improved regional security, trade opportunities and other economic spill-overs. Examples of some of the early regional CIIP efforts in the BSR include: • Example 1: The conception of cross-border TETRA-based PSS networks as part of the general effort to improve cooperation between government agencies operating in local regions either side of national borders. The initiatives with the BSR includes: the existing sharing arrangement between the Finnish VIRVE network and Estonian authorities (Laanet 2007), the envisioned interconnection of the Swedish (RAKEL) and Norwegian (Nodnett) PSS networks (Vollan 2006), as well as exploratory talks between Polish and Lithuanian officials for future PSS interconnection (Police Ministry of Interior 2007). Coincidentally, the vision of such cross-border is compatible with the Schengen treaty requirement for “the timely transmission of information for the purposes of cross-border surveillance and hot pursuit.” 105 • Example 2: The inception of a Nordisk CERT Forum (NCF) for cooperation and exchange of information on security incidents among eight academic and national CERT teams from Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. These example initiatives, while still admittedly piecemeal by focusing on only a subset of BSR countries, serve as a useful starting point for further BSR-wide initiatives (e.g., a Baltic Sea Region CERT). To that end, some form of regional or cross-border PPP with firm CIIP objectives is necessary to promote, implement and oversee the various regional CIIP strategic actions. This PPP could probably be initiated from a BSR project, such as, the BSR InnoNet project. 106 International The connectivity of information infrastructure has a global reach. Therefore, the threat actors are equally global in their presence and their attacks just as effective, regardless of location. Moreover, as globalization continues to take hold, the 105 Article 44 of Schengen acquis as referred to in Article 1(2) of Council Decision 1999/435/EC of 20 May 1999 (European Council 1999). Majority of BSR countries are now signatories of the Schengen Agreement. 106 The BSR InnoNet project is linking policymakers, agencies and analysts to create a joint innovation framework for the region (BSR Innonet 2007). 138 NORDREGIO REPORT 2007:5
CHAPTER III: INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY effects of a European or even global crisis now yields an even greater influence on the policies and decision-making processes of individual BSR countries. These realities combine to make the challenge of CIIP a truly international one, requiring international initiatives and programs that complement those at the regional and national levels. The EC has prioritized network and information security as one of the main hurdles that needs to be overcome on the road towards the creation of a single European information space (Commission 2006c). Furthermore, the EC launched a co-ordination project CI2RCO (Critical Information Infrastructure Research Co-ordination) that seeks to foster Europe-wide cooperation via common CIIP research platform and eliminate duplication of efforts in existing or planned R&D initiatives. Beyond the EC, the G8 was one of earliest international groupings to address the CIIP challenge, when in March 2003 a group of G8 Ministers of Justice and Interior adopted a set of eleven principles to be considered in developing national strategy for reducing risk to CII. International associations and standardization bodies are also responding to the CIIP challenge. Notably, the ITU recently commissioned a study on generic national frameworks for CIIP to assist countries that have either been late or lack the capacity to initiate national CIIP programs (Suter 2007). To that end, the BSR countries will be expected to play an increasingly significant role on matters of CIIP and information security in general. For instance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has endorsed plans by Estonia to set up a Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCD COE) that will concentrate on the needs of NATO member states (IET 2007). What is clear from all this is that CIIP challenges will be effectively tackled only by web of partnerships that are weaved initially from the national level, and eventually spread out to the regional and international levels. NORDREGIO REPORT 2007:5 139
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CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION
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PREFACE PREFACE With the Commission
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CHAPTER II: ELECTRICITY 2 ELECTRIC
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