Towards a Baltic Sea Region Strategy in Critical ... - Helsinki.fi

CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION IN THE BALTIC SEA REGION
from December 2006 (still in process when writing this), a terrorism-as-priority
approach was adopted, at least in the document’s introductory words:
“In December 2005 the Justice and Home Affairs Council called upon
the Commission to make a proposal for a European Programme for
Critical Infrastructure Protection (EPCIP) and decided that it should be
based on an all-hazards approach while countering threats from
terrorism as a priority. Under this approach, manmade, technological
threats and natural disasters should be taken into account in the critical
infrastructure protection process, but the threat of terrorism should be
given priority. If the level of protection measures against a particular
high level threat is found to be adequate in a critical infrastructure
sector, stakeholders should concentrate on other threats to which they
are still vulnerable.” (Commission 2006a, p. 13) 23
However, the decision mentioned here was taken already in December 2005, that
is, less than a month after the Green Paper was offered for comment, and it seems
that the priorities do not necessarily reflect the viewpoints of all the stakeholders.
In fact, in the proposed Directive articles terrorism is not prioritised so strongly
and the concept of ‘threat’ for instance is defined as “any indication, circumstance,
or event with the potential to disrupt or destroy critical infrastructure, or any
element thereof” (Commission 2006a, p. 16).
If we look this issue from the perspective of the BSR, it seems clear that
while the Member States are committed to the EU’s anti-terrorism policies, and
some Member States more than others even to the US-declared ‘war on terror’, the
above quoted Commission statement – “manmade, technological threats and
natural disasters should be taken into account in the critical infrastructure
protection process, but the threat of terrorism should be given priority” – seems
not to suit BSR conditions, whereas the Directive Proposal’s above quoted
approach – “any indication, circumstance, or event” – would fit much better.
Deliberate threats to CI or CII, individual non-political violent acts and
sabotage, criminal behaviour and organised crime, or politically motivated riots or
protests that threaten public order or law, are today much more the reality in the
BSR than terrorism. In fact, so far, no one has died in a modern terrorist attack in
the Baltic Sea Region, although some of the countries included have suffered from
terrorism In all probability terrorism will arrive in the region at some point –
indeed, as recently as September 2007 several people were arrested in Denmark
suspected of planning terrorist attacks – but its effects on individual citizens’
security as well as CI will likely be minimal compared to other threats. 24
23 Italics added by the author of this Introduction.
24 Indeed, should we compare terrorism to other external causes of death, we see that every year,
more than five million people worldwide die as a result of some kind of injury in every-day
accidents, most of which could be avoided. This accounts for nine percent of all deaths, placing
injuries in the top three causes of death. In the European region injuries cause about 800 000
deaths annually. Looking at the BSR in particular, we notice that in each country thousands of
deaths are caused annually by injuries in the form of different type of accidents. Moreover, for
every death due to injuries there are hundreds, if not thousands, of individuals who are either
hospitalised or treated in hospital emergency rooms or other healthcare facilities due to their
injury. Many of these injured people suffer long-term or permanent disabilities. In addition to all
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