Towards a Baltic Sea Region Strategy in Critical ... - Helsinki.fi

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CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION IN THE BALTIC SEA REGION A general impact on a greater number of people seems rather improbable. But it could happen that a gas leakage could cause major accidents involving tankers or ships with hazardous loads. There seems to be rather low evidence for the assumption that the construction and the operation of the NEGP could significantly worsen the current situation concerning dumped chemical munitions since the NEGP is limited to a narrow corridor and extensive investigations are carried out prior to construction. Table V—2 Pull-outs of chemical munitions east of Bornholm registered by Denmark. 112 Year Number of catches 1985* 46 2695 1986* 41 1830 1987* 14 582 1988* 19 1044 1989* 42 1966 1990* 19 979 1991* 103 5378 1992* 58 2597 1993 1994 Weight of chemical munitions in kg 1995** 6 40 1996** 10 210 1997** 9 184 1998** 5 290 1999** 3 185 2000** 11 512 2001** 11 514 2002** 10 345 2003** 25 1110 2004** 4 160 2005** 4 105 Weight of active gas in kg 112 Sources: *: HELCOM 1994, **www.helcom.fi (16.10.2007). 180 NORDREGIO REPORT 2007:5
CHAPTER V: GAS Economic consequences Gas leakage and the resulting reduction of gas delivery will first of all result in lower revenues. The direct economic damage from a gas leakage of one of the pipelines depends on the severity of the damage and the time it takes to detect and repair the leak. Given a complete interruption, an annual discharge of 27,5 Bcm (daily discharge at 75,000 Tcm) for one string and an average price level it would create revenue losses of about 10 to 20 million EUR/day, which is substantial. The Australian Office of Transport and Security states that a terrorist attack could weaken international confidence and damage future foreign investment in Australia’s energy industries. Indirect effects could include short-term oil price instability; pressure on joint offshore development and security arrangements between Timor-Leste and Australia; potential reluctance to work on offshore facilities; attendant bad publicity; and the imposition of additional security and hiring costs to operators of offshore-related or maritime-related enterprises (Office of Transport and Security, Australia 2004: 12-13). When considering indirect economic damage, one has to bear in mind that only the transfer of gas would be affected, not its production. The impact of the gas cut in January 2007, when Russia stopped its delivery to Ukraine, did not greatly affect the European economy. This was mainly due to the combination of availability of storage capacities, the activation of other supply chains and the warm winter. The consequences of a shut-down of the NEGP should be regarded in light of its contribution to gas supply. The gas supply via the NEGP will account for about 11% of total imports from Russia to the European Union, whereas imports via Ukraine make up two thirds of European gas import from Russia. So called ‘fear premiums’ could hit mainly the consumers in Western Europe by temporarily rising gas prices. The direct economic damage resulting from contamination by toxic warfare agents should be rather moderate since it has mainly local effects. Indirect economic impacts connected to a worsened public image of coastal Baltic Sea regions if accidents with dumped munitions are reported more frequently are unlikely. It has not yet been investigated whether the decomposition of dumped munitions due too corrosion could lead to accidents in coastal areas where especially the tourism and fisheries sectors could suffer losses. Nevertheless there have been accidents reported previously in that media (e.g. ZDF 2005) and it was stated that white phosphorus has been released due to a geological survey in the coastal waters near Usedom (AET 2007). It is however rather questionable whether the NEGP will cause such effects since extensive surveys are carried out prior to laying the pipeline. Paka (2007), states that other hydrotechnological investments (e.g. subsea cable) did not worsen the situation of released warfare agents. Environmental damage Responses to the proposal of Nord Stream regarding the Environmental Assessment for Finnish / German EEZ revealed major concerns that are related to the construction of the pipeline (BA Stralsund / BSH 2007, Finnish Ministry of the Environment 2007): • Impact on the Natura 2000 network NORDREGIO REPORT 2007:5 181
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Nordregio Report 2007:5 ISSN 1403-2
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5.4 Impacts caused by terrorism, na
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CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION
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PREFACE PREFACE With the Commission
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PREFACE The study includes tens of
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION CHAPTER I:
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CHAPTER II: ELECTRICITY 2 ELECTRIC
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CHAPTER II: ELECTRICITY electricity
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CHAPTER II: ELECTRICITY Recent clim
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CHAPTER II: ELECTRICITY Figure II
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CHAPTER II: ELECTRICITY centres etc
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