Towards a Baltic Sea Region Strategy in Critical ... - Helsinki.fi

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CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION IN THE BALTIC SEA REGION to national) VTS for the whole Gulf of Finland. High hopes exist that this would be operational in the Gulf of Finland in 2008. At the moment, the VTS system is functioning only in national waters, which means that ships entering them are more profoundly under the direct control of the operational centres than the ones navigating in international, GOFREP mandated water. The GOFREP system was taken into use in 2004, and its development was the result of intense cooperation between the MAs of these countries. The view shared by MAs, especially the Finnish and Russian ones, is that many people were thinking that with the introduction of the GOFREP ‘the world would be saved’. However, the national maritime authorities emphasise that the present version of the GOFREP does not abolish risks completely, not even those beyond human factors. Despite the possibility of warning ships, for example those on an incorrect route, it is evermore challenging for the GOFREP operators to follow the vessel traffic situation in the Gulf, simply because of the grown traffic. It has to be stressed that GOFREP is not an intelligent or ‘wise’ system at the moment. The above mentioned technical and system-based solutions can evade only part, albeit a big share, of the risks in marine traffic in the Gulf of Finland. The specific winter time conditions (Figure 7 above), especially the difficult ice conditions from January to April, form a central part of risks for traffic in this area. Navigation in ice is difficult, which accentuates the role of the human factor in vessel traffic safety. For example, when vessels manoeuvring in the Gulf of Finland are given the coordinates of icebreakers’ routes, the information always refers to a situation that has already passed, thus the open route on the ice might have changed. Heavy vessel traffic also forms queues of ships that line up after ice breakers, which multiplies the risk of rear-end collisions. Risk of collision is the greatest when smaller and bigger ships form these queues. Vessels and tankers of greater tonnage cannot stop in short distances, whereas smaller ones can and do. All these risks are part of the 20% of risks, induced by human factors, which cannot be erased at the moment by technical solutions and systems. However, the cooperation around safety issues and the establishment of the GOFREP system between Estonian, Finnish and Russian MA has enhanced also this ice manoeuvring safety, despite its above mentioned deficits. Legislative framework More agreements usually mean more cooperation. However, different agreements may cause differences in delivery. This has happened in the BSR in such a way that some apply HELCOM recommendations for exemptions, while others apply EU regulations. The Baltic Sea is now surrounded by EU Member States, so it is reasonable to assume that EU regulations and directives will gain more weight. However, since Russia is a major player in the region but not a member of the EU, it is important to hold onto the existing regional agreements and update them to meet the new challenges of the widened EU by anyway following the EU principle of complementarity, i.e. avoiding the duplication of work. A significant range of European legislation addresses maritime transportation and safety (e.g. Commission 2005a). The European Council is committed to oil spill preventive action, and after the tanker ‘Prestige’ accident decisions were taken by the European Council aimed at defining the general political guidelines 158 NORDREGIO REPORT 2007:5
CHAPTER IV: OIL TRANSPORTATION ANDMARITIME SAFETY for the European Union. In the European Union, it is mainly the Transport Council and the Environment Council that are responsible for this action. 109 The establishment of the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) strengthens EU’s role in the field of maritime safety and pollution prevention. After the 2004 EU enlargement Russia remains the only non-EU member state in the BSR, thus ensuring that the Baltic Sea will not form an internal sea of the EU. For this reason it is not possible to rely only on European action and legislation, even if the Commission does consider the transport and energy sectors amongst the most immediate priorities for action (Commission 2006a, p. 9). The so-called Helsinki Convention, Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area, was established in 1992 to protect this marine environment from all sources of pollution through intergovernmental cooperation between Denmark, Estonia, the European Community, Finland, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Russian Federation and Sweden. The intergovernmental body HELCOM was established to govern the convention, but since then HELCOM has produced many other decisions and recommendations, e.g. the Copenhagen Declaration on the Safety of Navigation and Emergency Capacity in the Baltic Sea Area 2001. HELCOM decisions or recommendations are not legally binding, but work almost as legislative instruments, since they are adopted unanimously with a serious endeavour by the parties to comply with them. In addition, there exist the international conventions of the IMO, which is part of the United Nations administration. The IMO named the Baltic Sea as a Special Sea Area (SSA) in 1995. This translates into several restrictions for e.g. discharges of oil, oily water, oily waste and garbage into the sea as well as for the emissions into the air (IMO 1973/78). Many IMO conventions and resolutions deal expressly with maritime security in the Baltic Sea (e.g. IMO 1972 and 2002; IMO Resolution A 978(24), IMO Resolution MSC 138(76)). Despite the regulations and in direct contravention of e.g. the MARPOL, about 300 operational discharges of oil take place annually (HELCOM 2004). En-route states with their national legislations cannot bind adjacent nations, and any regulatory and enforcement actions must be consistent with the international law e.g. UNCLOS (United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea) or IMO Conventions. These regulations, however, do not seem to be enough for coastal states burdened by the increasing traffic, and the likelihood of a major maritime disaster keeps growing. Most of the recommendations that come from the EU, HELCOM, IALA, EMSA, IMO and other international sea traffic-related organizations are being turned into a binding rule of marine safety procedures. However, the Estonian MA accentuated that problems also arise with the fact that there are so many international organizations with similar or largely overlapping functions, and thus, with similar recommendations to be followed. These organizations are also competing with each other over the question of which of the institutions should get more tasks in maritime safety regulation. Hoarding up these tasks seems to have been a way to justify their existence, which has resulted in a concentration more 109 The Commission’s proposal for a wider EU ban on all single-hulled oil tankers operating in EU waters was agreed upon recently. Internationally the deadline for the phase out for such vessels is 2015. NORDREGIO REPORT 2007:5 159
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Towards a Baltic Sea Region Strateg
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Nordregio Report 2007:5 ISSN 1403-2
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5.4 Impacts caused by terrorism, na
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CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION
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PREFACE PREFACE With the Commission
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PREFACE The study includes tens of
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION CHAPTER I:
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CHAPTER II: ELECTRICITY 2 ELECTRIC
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CHAPTER II: ELECTRICITY electricity
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CHAPTER II: ELECTRICITY Recent clim
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CHAPTER II: ELECTRICITY Figure II
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CHAPTER III: INFORMATION AND COMMUN
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