Towards a Baltic Sea Region Strategy in Critical ... - Helsinki.fi

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CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION IN THE BALTIC SEA REGION providers. On the other hand, network operators can expect improved operational flexibility and efficiency that in turn minimizes operational expenditures, rapid service launches, increased customer satisfaction and immediate returns on investments. However, the technological advances accompanying these evolutions also increase the number of ways and instances that an information infrastructure could be rendered vulnerable. Each one of the added vulnerabilities creates opportunities for attacks from an infinite number of threats, both known and previously unknown. For example, the widespread adoption of smartphones and PDAs with local Bluetooth and Internet connectivity has introduced malwares into the mobile communications arena, a threat previously synonymous with computer networks (Hyponnen 2006). 102 The security challenges are considerable as the interconnectivity and proliferation of devices goes beyond unprecedented levels, with each device and connection representing a possible security gap. Awareness of these security challenges is on the rise and some significant research is already being carried out to address them. 103 As CII becomes increasingly complex, failure prevention can never be total. Therefore, fault tolerance presents arguably the most effective method for automatic recovery from failures and their potentially highly disruptive outcomes (Liotine 2003). Fault tolerant systems are typically designed to detect failures instantly, avoid single point failures, isolate elements with persistent problems and enable repairs to be carried out even whilst continuing normal system operations. It therefore enables network user transactions to continue without any noticeable loss or interruption. These design objectives are met by providing redundancy, continuous status monitoring of network elements and automated recovery mechanisms. The majority of threat scenarios generated for CIIP studies and planning evoke scenes of destroyed or disabled infrastructure, thus necessitating methods such as fault tolerance to be designed into the infrastructure (that is, critical infrastructure protection). However, the increased decoupling of services and applications from the underlying infrastructure in future networks creates a new inter-infrastructure dimension for fault tolerance design, whereby a service or application could be continuously available by migrating from a damaged infrastructure to a working one as a way of adapting to a new user context. An example solution is the proposed Secured Infrastructure Router (SIR) that has multiple interfaces for connecting to alternative networks as a form of redundancy against failure to any of the networks (Kari 2007). Such capabilities present a paradigm shift to critical information protection within the CIIP concept, as it shifts the emphasis to availability, confidentiality and integrity of user’s information over a particular service or application, from traditional infrastructure protection. This service or application level protection mechanisms present significant cost and time advantages in comparison to preventing attacks by fortifying every node, 102 The number of known mobile malware nonexistent before 2004 has risen sharply to over 200 in late 2006. This is small when compared to over 200,000 known computer malware. However, with the number of mobile devices connected to Internet expected to significantly outstrip the number of PCs, the threat of mobile malware is likely to be a formidable one. 103 See, for example, Calin et al. (2006). 136 NORDREGIO REPORT 2007:5
CHAPTER III: INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY telehousing facility, cell site and length of cable of a network infrastructure. Moreover, it further emphasizes the need for cooperation between different CII owners to enable recovery of key services and applications (e.g., 112 emergency services) between their respective infrastructures, especially in moments of crises. 3.4 CONCLUSIONS AND WAY FORWARD National Most of the countries in the BSR are widely acknowledged as current models of leading information societies. Accompanying this success are the multiple challenges of CIIP to ensure delivery of key services and supplies, economic stability, and maintenance of overall national security. Governments are now addressing these challenges in various policy statements and strategic plans. For instance, the Finnish government recently issued a Government Resolution on The Strategy for Securing the Functions Vital to Society, whereby the importance of a the information and communications systems is stressed in almost all of the society’s vital functions. Most importantly, the government places particular emphasis on the need for interagency cooperation as a means for securing vital functions (SSFVS 2006; see also Kaskeala 2006). A common network infrastructure - such as the VIRVE TETRA network serving multiple government agencies - is one practical example of the advocated interagency cooperation. However, a majority of critical information assets in market economies are under the ownership of private sector organizations, a trend mirrored across the BSR. Furthermore, the interdependencies between organizations are getting increasingly complex, an attribute that renders itself to CIIP. This complexity highlights the fact that CIIP is not a problem confined to CII owners, hence accentuating the need for PPP frameworks. A PPP brings together all the national communities (public and private) with a potential stake in the CIIP efforts of early warning, detection, response, and crisis management. To that end, an effective PPP can prove beneficial to all partners, as it allows the sharing of the weight of responsibilities (including the investment in security), brings economies of scale and productive synergies are achieved. Furthermore, the cooperation between public and private partners creates a more streamlined decision making process on key CIIP projects. Moreover, cooperation provides the required analytical capacity and technical competence to understand the scope of the CIIP challenge and keep up with the effects of rapid ICT advances.104 Regional The cross-border interdependencies between organizations in the BSR are increasingly tight, particularly from the perspective of information infrastructure. For instance, NORDUnet has recently completed a fibre-based backbone 104 An example effort in this regard in Finland’s National Information Security Board (NISAB) composed of leading experts from the ICT and key government officials (Ministry of Transport and Communications 2004). NORDREGIO REPORT 2007:5 137
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Towards a Baltic Sea Region Strateg
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Nordregio Report 2007:5 ISSN 1403-2
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5.4 Impacts caused by terrorism, na
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CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION
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PREFACE PREFACE With the Commission
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION CHAPTER I:
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CHAPTER II: ELECTRICITY 2 ELECTRIC
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CHAPTER II: ELECTRICITY electricity
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CHAPTER VI: WATER CHAPTER VI: WATER
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