Towards a Baltic Sea Region Strategy in Critical ... - Helsinki.fi

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CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION IN THE BALTIC SEA REGION capabilities that provide a reliable flow of products and services essential to the defence and economic security of the US, the smooth functioning of governments at all levels, and society as a whole. In this definition additional infrastructures (to those eight mentioned previously) include food/agriculture, space, numerous commodities, the health care industry and the educational system. (PDD 1998). In the current United States approach CI is slightly different, even broader and connected to another concept, namely Key Resources (KR). The CI/KR sectors are defined in Table 2 (NIPP 2006, p. 17) 11 as constituting sixteen sectors. Table I—2 CI/KR sectors in the United States. Critical Infrastructure/Key Resource sectors in the USA Agriculture and Food Defence Industrial Base Energy Public Health and Healthcare National Monuments and Icons Banking and Finance Drinking Water and Water Treatment Systems Chemical Commercial Facilities Dams Emergency Services Commercial Nuclear Reactors, Materials and Waste Information Technology and Telecommunication Postal and Shipping Transportation Systems Government Facilities The NATO definition of CI When the concept of CI became more popular in European debates after 9/11, many of the basic elements of the US approaches were first transferred to Europe through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Thus, NATO’s Civil Protection Committee (CPC) proposed and Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee (SCEPC) accepted in 2003 a working definition for NATO’s CIP action, which is expressed in the NATO/Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) “Critical Infrastructure Protection Concept Paper” as follows: “Critical Infrastructure is those facilities, services and information systems which are so vital to nations that their incapacity or destruction would have a debilitating impact on national security, national 11 The original source of this table includes those sectoral US federal agencies responsible for the respective sectors, showing the cross-sectoral administrative challenge of CIP in a national context. 16 NORDREGIO REPORT 2007:5
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION economy, public health and safety and the effective functioning of the government.” (EAPC 2003, Annex 1, p. 2) 12 The definition is very wide, based on consensus between members. NATO emphasizes, however, that the CI does not follow the national confines but that their disruption or destruction will most probably have cascading effects in neighbouring countries. International cooperation is therefore needed, but the responsibility and accountability is to remain with governments. The need to increase exploratory and definitional work on the problems that may arise following the attacks on CI has been stated by the SCEPC. NATO clearly took a coordinative and advisory role in CIP issues among the EAPC nations and provides a platform for information sharing, threat and vulnerability assessments and the exchange of best practices on CIP. NATO is also involved in training and education in ensuring that countries recognize the importance of CIP. (NATO 2006; for an overview, see Abele-Wigert and Dunn 2006, p. 363ff.) NATO has no legislative power so the only way to influence the owners and operators of the CI – mainly the private sector – is by common action plans and the coordination of national legislative bodies. NATO’s goal is to make all EAPC countries realize the importance of CIP for their own nations and international community, and emphasize that CIP is as much as its weakest link. European Union definition of CI However, one can argue that the EU had by 2005 taken over the initiative from NATO to develop a multilateral European approach to CIP. The EU Commission adopted a similarly broad definition in its first main policy document, “Critical Infrastructure Protection in the Fight Against Terrorism” in 2004: “Critical infrastructures consist of those physical and information technology facilities, networks, services and assets which, if disrupted or destroyed, would have a serious impact on the health, safety, security or economic well-being of citizens or the effective functioning of governments in the member states. Critical infrastructures extend across many sectors of the economy, including banking and finance, transport and distribution, energy, utilities, health, food supply and communications, as well as key government services. Some critical 12 In NATO the main responsible body for the civil emergency planning is SCEPC (Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee). All the partners of PfP (Partnership for Peace) and of EAPC (Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council) can participate in the Committee. SCEPC has eight subcommittees that are responsible for the emergency planning for different sectors of society. These committees are FAPC (Food and Agriculture Planning Committee), CAPC (Civil Aviation Planning Committee), JMC (Joint Medical Committee), PBIST (Planning Board for Inland surface Transport), PBOS (Planning Board for Ocean Shipping), IPC (Industrial Planning Committee), CCPC (Civil Communications Planning Committee), CPC (Civil Protection Committee). In September 2001 EAPC created a working group under the CPC (CPC AHG Civil Protection Committee ad hoc group) to focus on CIP. Even if CPC is in charge of the NATO CIP action, other SCEPC working groups and committees participate in it too. CIP is considered a horizontal action and the interdependencies make cooperation between the different committees necessary. E.g. FAPC, IPC, CCOC, CAOC emphasize the relevance of CIP for their work. (Abele-Wigert and Dunn 2006, p. 363ff.) NORDREGIO REPORT 2007:5 17
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