Towards a Baltic Sea Region Strategy in Critical ... - Helsinki.fi

CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION IN THE BALTIC SEA REGION
utilities, industrial operations, construction sites and the management of major
public events. The critical nature of the tasks carried out by these professional
users means that they cannot rely solely on less robust public (mostly commercial)
communication networks for their work. The service provided by public networks
is more likely to be corrupted by security breaches or be totally unavailable during
critical situations. By contrast, PMR networks and MSs are specifically designed
to guarantee security and high service availability at all times. Moreover, low
PMR terminal and infrastructure costs provide optimum cost to coverage ratio, this
being an essential cost parameter since the PMR user base is generally smaller
compared to public networks.
The case of the 7/7 London bombings 67 is a useful example in illustrating the
aforementioned points. In the immediate aftermath of the bombing, public network
operators reported very sharp increase in the number of call attempts. The surprise
nature of the attack meant that the operators had no time to re-engineer their
networks to handle this extra traffic, and hence most of the calls ended up being
blocked (that is, callers got excessive busy tones). This lack of reliable
communications seriously hampered the emergency response and rescue effort. A
report by the 7 July Review Committee noted, among others, the following failings
(Greater London Authority 2006):
• Congestion in public networks left some senior emergency staff (who
where relying on public mobile communications) isolated from other field
teams and control room staff.
• Lack of communication facilities between the passengers and train
drivers increased the level of panic for passengers in the targeted trains.
• Lack of reliable communications between train drivers and line
controllers, as the antennas were damaged in the explosion. It was further
noted that the existing system suffered service interruptions in blind spots
within the tunnels.
• Inadequate or non-existent communications from trains to emergency
services and the London Underground Network Control Centre. This
meant that after the bombings emergency workers had to run from trains
to platforms to be able to communicate with colleagues and supervisors
above ground.
In the light of these failings, the 7 July Review Committee recommended that
digital PMR networks are fully implemented for all of London’s emergency
services and within its underground transport network (Greater London Authority
2006).
Overview of TETRA: A digital PMR standard
Development of the TETRA Standard
The use of analog PMR technology is recorded as early as the 1920s in the USA
and the 1950s in Europe54. In the subsequent decades different analog PMR
67 The bombings on 7th July 2005 were carried in four separate locations in London’s transport
system, killing 52 people and injuring over 700 people.
102 NORDREGIO REPORT 2007:5