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Towards a Baltic Sea Region Strategy in Critical ... - Helsinki.fi

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CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION IN THE BALTIC SEA REGION<br />

different agencies are afforded the same privacy and resources as they would <strong>in</strong><br />

dedicated networks, via strong guarantees on data protection and provision of<br />

high-speed data services.<br />

Example use of VIRVE is the <strong>in</strong>tegration of VIRVE with the 15 Emergency<br />

Response Centers (ERC) spread across F<strong>in</strong>land (Juvonen 2005; Vilppunen 2005).<br />

The ERCs receive about two million ambulance police or rescue-related phone<br />

calls made by the public to the 112 emergency number and forwards them to the<br />

appropriate agency via VIRVE. Another example of the use of VIRVE is by the<br />

Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) that has a mission to prevent and<br />

limit the harmful effects of radiation. Radiation measurement data is gathered<br />

every 10 m<strong>in</strong>utes from around 200 monitor<strong>in</strong>g stations <strong>in</strong> F<strong>in</strong>land. This data is then<br />

relayed by telemetry modules to STUK and local ERCs via VIRVE us<strong>in</strong>g TETRA<br />

IP packet data transfer and SDS messag<strong>in</strong>g as backup (Vesterbacka 2007).<br />

Security assessment methodologies<br />

The <strong>in</strong>creased ubiquity, diverse features and functionality of <strong>in</strong>formation systems<br />

have been accompanied by the <strong>in</strong>crease <strong>in</strong> complexity of implement<strong>in</strong>g necessary<br />

security measures. This has created a need for security frameworks to provide a<br />

streaml<strong>in</strong>ed way for assess<strong>in</strong>g and analyz<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>formation system security tak<strong>in</strong>g<br />

<strong>in</strong>to account: threats and attacks, vulnerabilities, and security (detection,<br />

correction and prevention) measures. To that end, a range of security assessment<br />

methodologies have been proposed, such as the follow<strong>in</strong>g:<br />

• CORAS: a UML-like model-based method for analyz<strong>in</strong>g threats and risks<br />

developed by the EU-funded CORAS project.(CORAS 2006)<br />

• OCTAVE®: “Operationally <strong>Critical</strong> Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability<br />

Evaluation” method is developed by Carnegie Mellon CERT<br />

Coord<strong>in</strong>ation Centre (CERT 2003).<br />

• STRIDE: “Spoof<strong>in</strong>g, Tamper<strong>in</strong>g, Repudiation, Information disclosure,<br />

Denial of Service and Escalation of privileges” method developed by<br />

Microsoft (Hernan et al 2006).<br />

• EBIOS: “Expression of Needs and Identi<strong>fi</strong>cation of Security Objectives”<br />

method developed by developed by the France’s Central Information<br />

Systems Security Division (Central Information Systems Security<br />

Division 2005).<br />

• eTVRA: eEurope secure and trusted <strong>in</strong>frastructure Threat, Vulnerability<br />

and Risk Assessment method be<strong>in</strong>g developed by Specialist Task Force<br />

(STF) 292, associated with Telecoms & Internet converged Services &<br />

Protocols for Advanced Networks (TISPAN) standardization body of<br />

ETSI (Judith et al 2007).<br />

The focus of this report is on the assessment methodology based on the ITU-T<br />

X.805 security architecture (ITU-T 2003) that was orig<strong>in</strong>ally developed and<br />

presented for standardization by Lucent Technology (formerly known as Bell<br />

Labs, now Alcatel-Lucent). The architecture was also later accepted by the<br />

International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the International<br />

Electrotechnical Committee (IEC) as the basis of a jo<strong>in</strong>t enterprise standard,<br />

ISO/IEC 18028-2.77 (ISO/IEC 2005).<br />

110 NORDREGIO REPORT 2007:5

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