Towards a Baltic Sea Region Strategy in Critical ... - Helsinki.fi

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CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION IN THE BALTIC SEA REGION Fact Box V—2 Permission procedure for NEGP in German EEZ and TW. On 11 November 2006 Nord Stream applied for permission of construction and operation of the pipeline in German EEZ and TW at the Bergamt Stralsund (Federal Mining Agency Stralsund, subordinated to the Mecklenburg- Vorpommern Ministry for Economic Affairs, Labour and Tourism) as well as at the Bundesamt für Seeschifffahrt und Hydrographie (Federal Maritime and Hydrographic Agency, BSH). The BSH states in its notification in accordance with Article 3 of the Espoo- Convention (EC EIA 1991), that three different permits are required for the construction of the pipeline (BSH 2006): “1. According to § 43 Energy Trade Law, a planning approval by the Federal Mining Agency Stralsund is needed for the section of the pipeline in German Territorial Waters. 2. According to § 133 fig. 1 Federal Mining Law, an approval with regard to technical and safety aspects by the Federal Mining Agency Stralsund is required. 3. According to § 133 fig. 2 Federal Mining Law, an approval with regard to the use of the waters and environmental aspects by the BSH is required. An EIA is obligatory for decisions fig. 1) and 3).” The application of Nord Stream included a scoping document, where the potential environmental impacts of the measure as well as the proposed assessment of the environmental impacts are described (Nord Stream 2006b). The responsible authorities, the BSH and the Bergamt Stralsund jointly decided upon the methodological framework for the EIA. According to this decision the EIA will touch concerns of CIP in some points, e.g. (BA Stralsund / BSH 2007): • a description of effects of damages to the pipeline by external impact which could be terrorist attacks or natural disasters, • a small-scale investigation (side scan sonar) and a large-scale investigation (magnetometer) of dumped munitions for the entire track; both approaches should cover at least 15 meters width, • an assessment of the effects of possible clean-up of munitions, • an assessment of the effects of a sudden gas leakage to the coastal population. 174 NORDREGIO REPORT 2007:5
CAPTER V: GAS National bodies responsible for security issues and security experts see a general possibility for terrorist attacks against offshore gas infrastructure. Each method of attack used in the following scenarios involves a high degree of difficulty given the location, size and complexity of the infrastructure (Australian Office of Transport and Security 2004): • Direct attack • Armed intrusion • Hijacked vessel/aircraft • Sabotage • Underwater attack The extended and isolated nature of the pipelines from offshore facilities make it practically impossible to guard them. However, the threat to offshore pipelines is reduced by the depth at which they traverse the seabed, thereby presenting a significant difficulty for would-be attackers (Australian Office of Transport and Security 2004). However, security experts regard a pipeline as a fairly vulnerable object, where one diver would be enough to set an explosive device (FOI 2007). Generally, the likelihood of a terrorist attack is regarded as rather low, since the political situation in the Baltic Sea Region is stable. Nevertheless, experts reckon that there are threats to Russian interests and citizens. If the current trend continues, the situation will worsen and, because the pipeline is meant to be in operation for five decades, a high level of uncertainty must be reckoned with (FOI 2007). Natural disasters Generally, seismic events, tsunamis, rough sea with strong swells, onshore winds, and storms could affect a subsea pipeline. Problems are also created by buried subsea pipelines becoming exposed, particularly after violent wave action associated with storms. This may cause stability problems or free spanning, which are both potential hazards for the pipeline (Pipeline and gas journal 2000). The landfall pipelines are exposed to the risk of rockfall impacts and the ice cover of coastal area (Nord Stream 2006a). Experience from the Gulf of Mexico shows that pipelines on the seabed suffered only minor damage after major hurricanes; most damage affected platforms and risers leading from bottom pipelines to the surface and for pipelines up to a depth of 60 meters (DNV 2006). In North Sea, sea storms have been known to expose pipeline trunks, which leads eventually to larger free spans and thus more stress on the pipelines (Bijker 2000). For NEGP, sea storms, rockfall and ice cover come into question, since seismic events or tsunamis are unlikely in the Baltic Sea Region. Dumped munitions A special point in discussion is the history of the Baltic Sea as a dumping ground for chemical and conventional munitions. The interaction between Nord Stream and the dumped munitions seems to constitute a specific threat scenario. NORDREGIO REPORT 2007:5 175
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CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION
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PREFACE PREFACE With the Commission
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