Towards a Baltic Sea Region Strategy in Critical ... - Helsinki.fi

CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION IN THE BALTIC SEA REGION
Figure III—4 A low-level concept mapping of the consequences of realized threats.
Nature of the Threats, Part I – Non-Human Factors
Threats to a CII may originate from a wide range of human or non-human factors,
as illustrated in the concept map of Figure 5.
Non-human factors are those whose resulting threats cannot be directly
attributed to human actions. This includes the events briefly outlined below.
I. Natural hazards
Natural hazards have the potential to cause direct physical destruction to CII and
CI in deployed the areas affected by the hazard, leading to widespread disruptions
(common- cause failures). For CII, elements such as aboveground transmission
lines, poles, towers and telehousing facilities, could be damaged by winter storms,
forest fires, earthquakes and so forth. Moreover, heavy downpours and flooding
could disrupt access holes and damage underground telecommunication cable
plant. The average hazard intensity class of past occurrences of various natural
hazards in the BSR is shown in Table 2. 49 Additional investment would usually be
required to reinforce CII against high-intensity hazards. This requirement is further
49 The average BSR hazard intensity is loosely derived from hazard intensity maps produced in the
EU ESPON 2006 project 1.3.1 (Geological Survey of Finland 2006).
90 NORDREGIO REPORT 2007:5