Towards a Baltic Sea Region Strategy in Critical ... - Helsinki.fi

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CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION IN THE BALTIC SEA REGION munitions. Therefore, in a critical infrastructure protection strategy hazard scenarios should be described and responsibilities for prevention and mitigation of the hazards should be defined. This strategy should address following issues: securing the pipeline against trawling and anchoring vessels; safeguarding of the most vulnerable parts of the pipelines (landfalls in Vyborg and Lubmin as well as the service platform); emergency response and repair of damage to the pipeline; avoidance of side effects of building and running the pipeline related to dumped munitions. The case study further discusses the different dimensions connected to this North European Gas Pipeline protection strategy. The political dimension comes from the fact that even if the pipeline is seen as a private sector activity, its strategic role in gas supply for the European gas market and the fact that it runs through the exclusive economic zones of five Baltic Sea states makes it a political issue. There are also several individual issues of political and security concerns that have arisen around the pipeline project. For instance, the plan of Nord Stream to erect a service platform next to the Swedish island of Gotland followed an intensive public debate in Sweden. A major concern was possible intelligence collection by Russia. Nord Stream has tried to build confidence especially as to the use and protection of the service platform. Major concerns about the pipeline have been expressed also by Poland, who has stated that the project illustrates an example of corridors and deals that have been decided upon above its head. The authors of the chapter state that it is important that the concerned states would find a common ground at the political level. Even if the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea clearly states that the pipeline operation should not be impeded, additional efforts about the relevant security issues are needed. The case study deals also with the institutional dimension of the issue. Nord Stream is responsible for operating the pipeline and principally it should have highest interest in developing and implementing a critical infrastructure protection strategy in order to avoid economic losses. To avoid these losses, it has to be assumed that Nord Stream will take care of detecting pipeline damage continuously and the fast repair of damaged parts of the pipeline. More complicated is the field of safeguarding and complex reactions in emergency responses that might be necessary in rare cases. Even if the risks mentioned above are low, the safeguarding of a pipeline that crosses the Baltic Sea at a length of 1,200 km is a multinational task. There must be a sound strategy developed together with experts from the affected states that concentrates on crucial points such as landfalls or pressure stations. But firstly, the case study notes, it has to be clarified who is responsible for safeguarding the pipeline – national coast guards, private security services, national intelligence agencies? Many mainly operational questions follow, such as by which means and what information will be gathered; how this information will be stored and analysed; will it be partly shared between involved security operators and intelligence agencies? Secondly, it has to be clarified who is responsible for emergency responses – national cost guards, private services, Nord Stream? – as well as who, and in what XXVI NORDREGIO REPORT 2007:5
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY cases, will lead the emergency response action? Of course, reaction plans and trainings are essential. In order to find the way forward, and keeping in mind that the critical infrastructure protection of the pipeline has a political dimension, it seems advisable that the protection strategy be developed and implemented by a broader panel comprising security experts and political decision makers. For this purpose existing bodies, such as the Council of the Baltic Sea States – as the authors of the case study propose – should be considered to see whether they could moderate the process. It would also be possible to establish a separate intergovernmental/interadministrative working structure. Another special issue is the dumped munitions, which extend beyond the pipeline itself. Being part of the protection strategy for the pipeline track it should be discussed comprehensively in a broader forum. It is essential that all available information concerning the investigation of dumped munitions is made available and that, based on an actual evaluation of the potential risks, the need for further action is decided at a political level. The economic dimension is crystallized in the fact that since the most significant effect of a pipeline disruption could be turbulences in gas markets, there has to be found solutions for securing gas supply by either re-routing the supply via other pipelines or assuring enough storage volume to overcome a period lasting from several days to several weeks. The costs for securing and repairing the North European Gas Pipeline are presumably small in comparison to the revenue loss, should the pipeline be disrupted. Therefore the protection of the pipeline should be a clear task and in the interest of Nord Stream and the consumers that benefit from it. The social dimension comprises the fact that the North European Gas Pipeline protection has to be directed mainly to those groups and people that would be most directly affected by accidents along the pipeline, such as fishermen, ships’ crews as well as pipeline workers. The pipeline could also support information campaigns to people living along the Baltic Sea coast about what to do in case of accidents involving dumped munitions. Finally, there is the technological dimension of the needed protection strategy. The case study states that two aspects should be taken into account: the technological opportunities in safeguarding using new technologies (cameras, satellites, sonar) as well as the vulnerabilities of pipelines to attack, which is why the access by terrorist groups to technology have especially to be continuously monitored. Water The last of the case studies, Chapter VI, is about clean water, and more specifically about the risks for shallow groundwater aquifers in coastal areas of the Baltic Sea. A very detailed, empirical case study, providing original data, focuses on the effects of sea water rise on groundwater aquifers in the Hanko Area in South Finland. Lack of water, especially from high quality groundwater would mean a crisis for all relevant users, such as residents and industrial sectors. Increasing cooperation among administration, industrial and other relevant sectors on the strategies of groundwater protection is needed and can be done by increasing NORDREGIO REPORT 2007:5 XXVII
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