Towards a Baltic Sea Region Strategy in Critical ... - Helsinki.fi

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CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION IN THE BALTIC SEA REGION mass gatherings, or in the aftermath of a sudden catastrophe, whereby an uncharacteristically large number of subscribers attempts to call or text friends and family at the same time. Members of the general public may also disrupt system operations by accidental damage to a system asset. Accidental telecommunication cable cuts due to construction or farming activities are a common cause of largescale service outages. For example, an accidental double cable cut in Sprint’s backbone network in January 2006 left millions of their fixed and wireless customers cut-off for over three hours in the west coast of the USA (Poulsen 2006). Table III—4 Brief overview of actions and positioning of various non-deliberate CII threat actors. Threat Actors Positioning Cause of Non-Deliberate Threat Actions Unintended Consequences of Threat Action General public Outsiders Accidental damage to system assets Interruption, destruction Employees/ contractors Insiders Negligence, sloppiness, human error, omission, fatigue, insufficient or poor training, incapacitation Interruption, destruction, corruption, removal, disclosure End-users/ customers/subscri bers Insiders Carelessness; inadvertent system overload Interruption Methods of Attack The previous subsection highlighted potential threat actors and their possible motivations for carrying out attacks on a CII. Although their motivations may differ significantly, the attack methodologies employed by different actors may be the same. For instance, a cyber-criminal, hacktivist, terrorist and website defacer may exploit the same vulnerability to break into a web server even if it is for totally different reasons. Threat actions on a CII can be executed by the threat actor gaining physical access to the CII or remotely using network-based connections provided by the CII itself. The former has been the access method of choice for deliberate threat actors intent on disrupting or inflicting physical damage on infrastructure. For example, a threat actor may deliver chemical agents or explosive devices (e.g., person-borne, by vehicle, by post etc.) to a physical site of a critical infrastructure with an intention of incapacitating key personnel (e.g., system administrators, train driver, security guards etc.) or damaging critical assets (e.g., server farms, telephone exchanges, train carriages, power transformers etc.). Information infrastructure also presents a unique security challenge, whereby network-based access enables delivery and execution of threat actions, with the end results being just as debilitating to the system as a physical attack. The targets of these attacks are non-tangible information flows, stored data, network resources or software resident in the system. The threat is delivered in the form of malicious logic, a blanket term defined in IETF RFC 8282 to refer to any hardware, software, or firmware that is intentionally included or inserted in a system for a 96 NORDREGIO REPORT 2007:5
CHAPTER III: INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY harmful or undesired purpose (Shirey 2000). This is further illustrated in the concept of map Figure 7. Figure III—7 Concept mapping of malicious logic in information and communication systems. Malicious software or malware has long presented a significant security threat that has become more pronounced with the ubiquitous connectivity enabled by the Internet. 59 As an indication of existing threats, in a recent ‘honey pot’ experiment a computer running Windows XP (Service Pack 1) with no anti-software software was connected to the Internet and ended being successfully infected by worms within 18 minutes, and in one week was scanned over 46,000 times by remote computers looking for vulnerabilities (Wehner 2006). Attacks on CII using malicious logic is quickly becoming the preferred modus operandi for various deliberate threat actors, since such an attack has a very low cost of entry, is effective in the disruption it causes, and carries a low risk of being apprehended. The proliferation of undesired data (spam) in information and communication systems also constitutes a threat, in the way that the delivery, filtering and subsequent deletion of this unsolicited data consumes valuable bandwidth, storage and human resources. Some security analysts now believe that the volume of e- mail spam is increasing at levels that are threatening the viability of global e- mailing system (Gillis 2007) 60 . 59 For example, the infamous ILOVEYOU worm managed to infect 10% of all computers connected to the Internet in just one day of May 2000, leading to damages in the range of €4 to €7 billion. 60 A study by Gillis (2007) estimates that e-mail spam volume doubled in the period between October 2005 - October 2006, vastly outnumbering legitimate e-mail messages. Critically a third NORDREGIO REPORT 2007:5 97
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Towards a Baltic Sea Region Strateg
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Nordregio Report 2007:5 ISSN 1403-2
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5.4 Impacts caused by terrorism, na
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CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION
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PREFACE PREFACE With the Commission
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PREFACE The study includes tens of
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION CHAPTER I:
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CHAPTER V: GAS CHAPTER V: GAS Sven
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CHAPTER VI: WATER CHAPTER VI: WATER
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