Towards a Baltic Sea Region Strategy in Critical ... - Helsinki.fi

CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION IN THE BALTIC SEA REGION
In accordance with the case studies of this volume, it is proposed that the
specific regional conditions should be reflected in the multilateral critical
infrastructure protection strategies in order them to become effective. There is
therefore a need for a regional strategy of critical infrastructure protection in the
Baltic Sea Region. This regional strategy could best be coordinated – in close
cooperation and consent with other regional councils and networks – by the
Council of the Baltic Sea States, an intergovernmental organization including all
the Baltic Sea Region countries (that is, also non-European Union countries
Russia, Norway and Iceland) as well as the European Commission as full
members. This regional strategy should be based on full consensus of the parties,
thus leaving strongly contested issues beyond its scope. Its focus should be on
regional cross-border critical infrastructures as part of the infrastructures defined
by the European Union as European critical infrastructure, as well as address
regionally determined vulnerabilities and interdependencies of the national critical
infrastructures. This strategy should be sensitive to the national critical
infrastructure protection strategies, definitions and specific features of the Baltic
Sea Region countries, without complicating the European Union –wide
development of common standards and strategies within the European Programme
for Critical Infrastructure Protection.
Electricity
Chapter II provides a detailed case study in the field of electricity. Modern society
is highly dependent on electricity, telecommunications and other services
delivered through complex technical systems. A well functioning technical
infrastructure is important to everyday life, economic welfare and national
security. In an energy intensive society, better functioning is continuously
expected from the electric grid. Due to increasing energy dependence, a major
blackout in urban areas would virtually paralyse the whole society.
Natural disasters, bad weather, technical failures, human errors, terrorism and
acts of war may cause disturbances in the technical infrastructures of society. A
common reason for long-lasting and widespread electric power system blackouts
in the Baltic Sea Region is the weather. Examples include storms, blizzards, ice
storms, extreme cold weather and floods.
The specific analytical angle in this chapter is that of the infrastructure
system interdependencies of the rescue services in the case of electricity blackouts.
Rescue services as ‘first responders’ are responsible for detection, assessment,
alerting and dispatching of specialized life support and life safety assets in society.
While there is a lot of experience in carrying out risk assessment and response
training exercises directed to other organizations in society, relatively little
attention has been paid to the potential vulnerability of the rescue services
organizations themselves. Failures in critical infrastructures would undoubtedly
affect their ability to carry out their duties in a negative way.
The case study focuses on Finland, with some comparison with Sweden.
Emphasis is placed on the electric power systems and on steps needed to mitigate
the effects of lost critical infrastructure services on the mission capability of the
rescue services. Information about how the mission capability is affected by long
lasting and widespread blackouts has been collected from experiencies learnt from
the Janika- and Pyry-storms in Finland and the Gudrun-storm in Sweden.
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