Towards a Baltic Sea Region Strategy in Critical ... - Helsinki.fi

More documents

Recommendations

Info

CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION IN THE BALTIC SEA REGION which demand classification of part of the information on the ships’ cargos and routes. The fear the Russian party expressed was that when giving more precise information about the ships, the Russian MA cannot be absolutely sure that this information stays away from the hands of terrorists. With Russia, therefore, we can clearly see the distinction in defining the concepts of safety and security. 4.4 PRESENT SAFETY SOLUTIONS Cross-border safety efforts: GOFREP and AIS GOFREP – the Gulf of Finland Mandatory Ship Reporting System was developed to match the safety needs associated with the rapid growth in vessel traffic. The central idea of GOFREP is to gather information on ships, their cargo and routes, so that the authorities responsible of vessel traffic control (the Estonian, Finnish and Russian MAs) have information on ships navigating in the Gulf of Finland. In addition, the ships that are about to enter the GOFREP area have to report via radio to the operator centre, and the operators can warn and give advice to the ships about various situations (weather, ice, other vessels, manoeuvrable routes etc.) in the Gulf. In July 2005, a system called the Automatic Identification System (AIS) was launched to give more and precise information about the maritime traffic in the Baltic Sea. The preparation of the system was initiated in 2001 and it is now the dominating automatic system to observe the vessel traffic in the Baltic Sea. The AIS is incorporated into the GOFREP system, but at the moment the information provided through it for vessel traffic operators does not help the operators predict near future traffic situations. The significant amount of information gathered by the AIS is not available to be used in real-time by the operators. The international waters of the Gulf of Finland, which equals the GOFREP area, has been divided into three areas of responsibility (Figure 10). Southern part and eastbound route (ships entering the Gulf of Finland from the West) are controlled by the Estonian operator centre, the northern route is controlled by the Finnish operator centre and the easternmost strip of international water is controlled by the Russian operation centre. This easternmost strip was annexed into the GOFREP system on the 1 st of July 2007. A large part of the eastern Gulf of Finland is under the jurisdiction of the Russian national vessel traffic service system. When a ship enters national waters it is simultaneously handed over from the GOFREP system to a national Vessel Traffic Service (VTS). The national VTS is quite similar to the air traffic control system, since with the VTS MA (traffic controllers) give not only advice but also commands about movements in national waters. The northern GOFREP mandated and Finnish controlled route in the Gulf of Finland is very crucial what comes to safety of oil traffic. Full-loaded oil tankers, which have started their voyage from the Russian oil ports in the Karelian Isthmus or St. Petersburg, travel along the coast of Finland, and during winter, in difficult ice conditions. In addition to the Russian part of the route, this lane of the motorway of the seas is the most risky one, due to the criss-crossing of traffic. 156 NORDREGIO REPORT 2007:5
CHAPTER IV: OIL TRANSPORTATION ANDMARITIME SAFETY Figure IV—10 GOFREP area and territorial waters. When justifying the further development of safety-enhancing systems in the Gulf of Finland, the Finnish authorities referred first to the internal safety assessment that they had done in the area. According to the Finnish authorities by using routing systems, risks can be reduced by only 30%, but if reporting, surveillance and traffic control are carried out, risks can be reduced by 80%. Despite this, the accident risk induced by human factors will still remain as high as for 20 %. The ship and its crew are still in a central position to avoid risks and accidents induced by human factors. The Estonian authorities also said that the AIS and GOFREP systems are the best things that can be done at the moment in order to guarantee the safety of oil transports and marine safety at large in the Gulf of Finland. This reveals the difference between the Finnish and the Estonian authorities’ views, since the Finnish more categorically view this phase just as a good beginning on the way towards a more comprehensive system. A central shortcoming of the present system, according to the Finnish authorities, is that the system has merely an advisory role in directing and controlling sea traffic in the Gulf of Finland. The objective of the Finnish marine safety authorities is to develop the system into a sea traffic control system that resembles the one of air traffic in its legal and functional forms. To back this view, the Russian authorities emphasized similarly the fact that despite the newlyintroduced AIS and GOFREP systems, the risk level in the Gulf of Finland is getting worse. Estonian, Finnish and Russian MAs are trying to put forward, through national ministries of transport, and eventually the International Maritime Organization (IMO), a developed version of GOFREP and a common (in contrast NORDREGIO REPORT 2007:5 157
Page 1:
Towards a Baltic Sea Region Strateg
Page 4 and 5:
Nordregio Report 2007:5 ISSN 1403-2
Page 6 and 7:
5.4 Impacts caused by terrorism, na
Page 8 and 9:
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION
Page 11 and 12:
PREFACE PREFACE With the Commission
Page 13:
PREFACE The study includes tens of
Page 16 and 17:
Page 18 and 19:
Page 20 and 21:
Page 22 and 23:
Page 24 and 25:
Page 26 and 27:
Page 28 and 29:
Page 30 and 31:
Page 32 and 33:
Page 34 and 35:
Page 36 and 37:
Page 39:
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION CHAPTER I:
Page 42 and 43:
Page 44 and 45:
Page 46 and 47:
Page 48 and 49:
Page 50 and 51:
Page 52 and 53:
Page 54 and 55:
Page 56 and 57:
Page 58 and 59:
Page 60 and 61:
Page 62 and 63:
Page 64 and 65:
Page 66 and 67:
Page 68 and 69:
Page 70 and 71:
Page 72 and 73:
Page 74 and 75:
Page 76 and 77:
Page 78 and 79:
Page 80 and 81:
Page 82 and 83:
Page 84 and 85:
Page 86 and 87:
Page 88 and 89:
Page 90 and 91:
Page 92 and 93:
Page 95 and 96:
CHAPTER II: ELECTRICITY 2 ELECTRIC
Page 97 and 98:
CHAPTER II: ELECTRICITY electricity
Page 99 and 100:
CHAPTER II: ELECTRICITY Recent clim
Page 101 and 102:
CHAPTER II: ELECTRICITY Figure II
Page 103 and 104:
CHAPTER II: ELECTRICITY possibiliti
Page 105 and 106:
CHAPTER II: ELECTRICITY continental
Page 107 and 108:
CHAPTER II: ELECTRICITY Indirect Im
Page 109 and 110:
CHAPTER II: ELECTRICITY fire depart
Page 111 and 112:
CHAPTER II: ELECTRICITY • Local c
Page 113 and 114:
CHAPTER II: ELECTRICITY these, syst
Page 115 and 116:
CHAPTER II: ELECTRICITY • long in
Page 117 and 118:
CHAPTER II: ELECTRICITY • The net
Page 119:
CHAPTER II: ELECTRICITY centres etc
Page 123 and 124:
CHAPTER III: INFORMATION AND COMMUN
Page 125 and 126:
Page 127 and 128:
Page 129 and 130:
Page 131 and 132:
Page 133 and 134:
Page 135 and 136:
Page 137 and 138:
Page 139 and 140:
Page 141 and 142:
Page 143 and 144: CHAPTER III: INFORMATION AND COMMUN
Page 177: CHAPTER III: INFORMATION AND COMMUN
Page 181 and 182: CHAPTER IV: OIL TRANSPORTATION AND
Page 193: CHAPTER IV: OIL TRANSPORTATION ANDM
Page 197 and 198: CHAPTER IV: OIL TRANSPORTATION ANDM
Page 203: CHAPTER V: GAS CHAPTER V: GAS Sven
Page 206 and 207: CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION
Page 225: CHAPTER VI: WATER CHAPTER VI: WATER
Page 244 and 245:
Page 246 and 247:
Page 248 and 249:
Page 250 and 251:
Page 252 and 253:
Page 254 and 255:
Page 256 and 257:
Page 258 and 259:
Page 260 and 261:
Page 262 and 263:
Page 264 and 265:
Page 266 and 267:
Page 268 and 269:
Page 270 and 271:
Page 272 and 273:
Page 274 and 275:
Page 276:
show all

Towards a Baltic Sea Region Strategy in Critical ... - Helsinki.fi

Create successful ePaper yourself

Delete template?

Save as template?