Towards a Baltic Sea Region Strategy in Critical ... - Helsinki.fi

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CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION IN THE BALTIC SEA REGION More reliable electric power systems The current goal is to reduce the recovery time to six hours, even during exceptional circumstances. The current network structure does not support this, as noted earlier. There are several ways of reducing the interruption time following major storms. The most efficient one is to replace the aerial lines with underground cables, to some extent. This makes the network less vulnerable to most weather phenomena; however, as it has been pointed out earlier in the text, it also makes repairing of damages significantly slower. Class I and II storms do not require the entire network to be replaced, class III on the other hand, does. Another way of reducing interruption time is by increasing the service personnel. This is a possible solution when dealing with class I storms and to some extent when dealing with class II. However, for class III storms this is not a viable option. There are also smaller and less expensive ways of improving the power delivery safety. Non-tree-proof wire paths can be improved by cutting all the branches on the inside of the path, forcing the trees to fall away from the path due to e.g. heavy snow masses. Aerial lines due for renewal should whenever possible be moved from the forests to the sides of the roads. This reduces the risk of the lines being damaged by falling trees and makes it easier for service personnel to reach the damaged spots. Regardless of all investments in electricity networks and their better reliability continuous electricity supply cannot be guaranteed. If production or other activities need continuous electricity supply, must the customer himself take the actions to secure continuous electricity supply? Better resilience Even if the primary point of view of this research was electricity network – critical infrastructure – protection, in the conclusion of the research, there are many elements of improving critical infrastructure resilience (CIR) 47 like having readymade plans of how and when personnel should be called in or put in stand-by, keeping maps up to date, following weather forecasts, making deals with third parties for providing spare parts and additional equipment, cooperation with the emergency services, etc. The down time can be significantly reduced by increasing preparedness. The storm classification and the mathematical model in each category also give a good solid foundation to build up a common knowledge on extreme long electricity blackouts to all parties involved. In the future the information from building information system and information from electricity network simulation model should be combined and so we will have more detailed information what consequences possible extreme long electricity blackout have on activities in different type of buildings. This way we can find out vulnerable activities, such as telecommunication nodes, waterworks, and sewage farms or vulnerable groups in buildings such as hospitals, nursing homes for older people, schools, day-care 47 See the discussion on resilience or CIR in Chapter I: Introduction 1.5. 80 NORDREGIO REPORT 2007:5
CHAPTER II: ELECTRICITY centres etc. This enables better preparedness planning so that electricity companies can focus their repair activities correctly and better preparedness planning with better situation awareness is also the key to successful rescue operations. In order to achieve better resilience, even the role of the general public is an important factor; it is not the concern of some professional elite alone. Preparedness is to be maintained on all levels, from the common citizen on the street to governmental departments. For example, a home supply of emergency food, drinking water, flash lights, batteries and blankets, etc. is of great significance during a disturbance situation such as a prolonged power blackout. The emergency services form an important part of critical infrastructure resilience, as they normally are the first ones to respond when a disturbance or accident occurs. However, it is important to note that the emergency services themselves form a kind of CI, vulnerable to disturbances. Therefore, emergency service organizations should have their own emergency contingency plans, enabling them to function efficiently even during exceptional circumstances when resources are limited. NORDREGIO REPORT 2007:5 81
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Towards a Baltic Sea Region Strateg
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Nordregio Report 2007:5 ISSN 1403-2
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5.4 Impacts caused by terrorism, na
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CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION
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PREFACE PREFACE With the Commission
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PREFACE The study includes tens of
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION CHAPTER I:
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CHAPTER VI: WATER CHAPTER VI: WATER
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