Towards a Baltic Sea Region Strategy in Critical ... - Helsinki.fi
Towards a Baltic Sea Region Strategy in Critical ... - Helsinki.fi
Towards a Baltic Sea Region Strategy in Critical ... - Helsinki.fi
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION<br />
systems seem to be expand<strong>in</strong>g.” One ma<strong>in</strong> reason for this, Egan argues, is that <strong>in</strong><br />
modern societies there exists set of systems “that are not part of the CI <strong>in</strong> their<br />
current state but which may be <strong>in</strong> the years to come.”<br />
In this section, we discuss some relevant of<strong>fi</strong>cial def<strong>in</strong>itions of CI <strong>in</strong> the<br />
comparative perspectives of the United States, NATO, the EU, and the BSR<br />
countries. We may f<strong>in</strong>d that though these def<strong>in</strong>itions and typologies overlap, they<br />
are also <strong>in</strong> many ways different <strong>in</strong> their exact understand<strong>in</strong>gs of what are the<br />
critical sectors and also <strong>in</strong> more fundamental perspective about what to focus on <strong>in</strong><br />
their strategies.<br />
However, a general trend seems to be that while <strong>in</strong>frastructures or CI were<br />
perhaps earlier understood as someth<strong>in</strong>g very stable and concrete, either physical<br />
or <strong>in</strong>formation and communication technology systems, there seems to be a trend<br />
towards a broad, holistic understand<strong>in</strong>g of CI, where it is understood as networks<br />
or systems of vital functions of the society as a whole or the <strong>in</strong>frastructures<br />
embedded <strong>in</strong> these functions.<br />
United States’ def<strong>in</strong>ition of CI<br />
The development of the def<strong>in</strong>ition of CI <strong>in</strong> the United States illustrates the<br />
expansion of the concept. Moteff et al. (2003) have analysed the US debate and<br />
of<strong>fi</strong>cial documents s<strong>in</strong>ce 1980s to the current post-9/11 Homeland Security era.<br />
While they notice that before CI became a term used <strong>in</strong> security debates, public<br />
policymakers commonly used the seem<strong>in</strong>gly similar term ‘<strong>in</strong>frastructure’ as an<br />
object to be protected. However, <strong>in</strong> those early debates the concern often was the<br />
issue of ‘natural’ long-term deterioration and erosion of the important<br />
<strong>in</strong>frastructures and the need for more public fund<strong>in</strong>g to modernise them. When the<br />
issue became more about the ‘vulnerability’ or ‘criticality’ of those <strong>in</strong>frastructures<br />
<strong>in</strong> case of security-related rather sudden events, the criteria for an <strong>in</strong>frastructure to<br />
be judged critical became that it must be vital to one or several broad national<br />
functions.<br />
The 1997 President’s Commission def<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong>frastructures as mostly the<br />
privately-owned ‘basic foundations’ for society. The report stated that:<br />
“By <strong>in</strong>frastructure we mean more than just a collection of <strong>in</strong>dividual<br />
companies, engaged <strong>in</strong> related activities; we mean a networks of<br />
<strong>in</strong>dependent, mostly privately owned, man-made systems and processes<br />
that function collaboratively and synergistically to produce and<br />
distribute a cont<strong>in</strong>uous flow of essential goods and services” (PCCIP<br />
1997, p. 3).<br />
Moteff et al. (2003) argue that the set and number of those sectors, <strong>in</strong>frastructures<br />
or functions def<strong>in</strong>ed as critical or vital have been variables. Indeed, the President’s<br />
Commission 1997 focused <strong>in</strong> its report on eight <strong>in</strong>frastructures “whose <strong>in</strong>capacity<br />
or destruction would have a debilitat<strong>in</strong>g impact on our defence and economic<br />
security”. These eight <strong>in</strong>frastructures were telecommunication, electric power<br />
systems, natural gas and oil, bank<strong>in</strong>g and f<strong>in</strong>ance, transportation, water supply<br />
systems, government services and emergency services. (PCCIP 1997, Appendix 1.)<br />
A year later, the def<strong>in</strong>ition was broadened and <strong>in</strong>frastructure was def<strong>in</strong>ed as<br />
the framework of <strong>in</strong>terdependent networks and systems compris<strong>in</strong>g identi<strong>fi</strong>able<br />
<strong>in</strong>dustries, <strong>in</strong>stitutions (<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g people and procedures), and distribution<br />
NORDREGIO REPORT 2007:5 15