Towards a Baltic Sea Region Strategy in Critical ... - Helsinki.fi

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CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION IN THE BALTIC SEA REGION organizational processes. All the nodes are tightly interconnected by organizational intradependencies, whereby significant change or disturbance in any node (such as, changes that affect security e.g., attacks on physical elements, staff cuts, technology upgrades etc.) distorts the overall shape of organizational model. Therefore, for the organization to retain its shape, simultaneous changes are necessary in other nodes to compensate for this initial change. Figure III—27 Four node organization model and its intradependencies. From the point of view of information security, most organizations now implement and maintain a diverse set of information security controls that span all the four nodes of Figure 27. These controls are amalgamated under some formal information security management (ISM) system. ISM systems are well established as an integral component in most organizations and a range of standards have been published to guide their implementation (Kenning 2001). 86 The primary focus of ISM tends to be more inward-looking, by putting an emphasis on the intradependencies within an organization, and treating the interdependency with nodes belonging to other organizations as a secondary issue. By contrast, CIIP objectives have a broader scope, placing equal emphasis on both intradependencies and interdependencies associated with a particular organization. 86 An example ISM standard is the tripartite BS 7799 standard that was developed in the early 1990s in response to demand from private and public sector organizations for a common information security framework. The standard initially published by the British Standards Institute, has since been internationalized as the ISO/IEC standards 27001 and 27002. 128 NORDREGIO REPORT 2007:5
CHAPTER III: INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY Interdependencies are particularly strong for CII, as they have more prominent ICT constituents that tend to be highly networked (that is, cyber interdependency). Figure III—28 Organizational interdependencies that may exist at national, regional and international levels. The unexpected but high-impact threats considered in CIIP possess both a local and global dimension, necessitating the requirement to understand the complex, multidimensional and sometimes deep interdependencies that may exist between organizations at national, regional and international levels (see Figure 28). This understanding enables CIIP planners to foresee how disruptive events could potentially propagate through multiple organizations, and also assist them in identifying critical nodes. However, several developments are needed for CIIP to reach the practical level of maturity attained by ISM practices (Bailas 2006). Among other things, this demands the publication of internationally agreed CIIP standards and best practices, the planning of unlikely but realistic scenarios for emergency preparedness exercises, and the design of computer-aided tools for (intra)interdependency simulations, decision support, crisis management, and so forth. 87 Against the background of these organizational changes and interdependencies, governments are expected to provide a secure and conducive operating environment for businesses, unbiased leadership, as well as authority for 87 ISM practitioners currently have a wide range of tools at their disposal. For instance, the CRAMM toolkit automates the use of the BS7799 standards (Cramm 2006). Some of the early CIIP efforts in this context includes the SimCIP (Simulation for Critical Infrastructure Protection) tool being developed within the IRRIIS project (IRRIIS 2006). NORDREGIO REPORT 2007:5 129
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Towards a Baltic Sea Region Strateg
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Nordregio Report 2007:5 ISSN 1403-2
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5.4 Impacts caused by terrorism, na
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CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION
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PREFACE PREFACE With the Commission
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PREFACE The study includes tens of
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION CHAPTER I:
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CHAPTER II: ELECTRICITY 2 ELECTRIC
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CHAPTER II: ELECTRICITY electricity
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CHAPTER VI: WATER CHAPTER VI: WATER
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