Towards a Baltic Sea Region Strategy in Critical ... - Helsinki.fi

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CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION IN THE BALTIC SEA REGION elements in these sectors are not strictly speaking ‘infrastructure’, but are in fact, networks or supply chains that support the delivery of an essential product or service.” (Commission 2004, p. 3-4) Table I—3 Critical infrastructure sectors according to the EU. CI Sector I Energy II Nuclear industry III Information, Communication Technologies, ICT IV Water V Food VI Health VII Financial VIII Transport IX Chemical industry X Space XI Research facilities CI Sub-sector 1 Oil and gas production, refining, treatment, storage and distribution by pipelines 2 Electricity generation and transmission 3 Production and storage/processing of nuclear substances 4 Information system and network protection 5 Instrumentation automation and control systems (SCADA etc.) 6 Internet 7 Provision of fixed telecommunications 8 Provision of mobile telecommunications 9 Radio communication and navigation 10 Satellite communication 11 Broadcasting 12 Provision of drinking water 13 Control of water quality 14 Stemming and control of water quantity 15 Provision of food and safeguarding food safety and security 16 Medical and hospital care 17 Medicines, serums, vaccines and pharmaceuticals 18 Bio-laboratories and bio-agents 19 Payment and securities clearing and settlement infrastructures and systems 20 Regulated markets 21 Road transport 22 Rail transport 23 Air transport 24 Inland waterways transport 25 Ocean and short-sea shipping 26 Production and storage/processing of chemical substances 27 Pipelines of dangerous goods (chemical substances) 28 Space 29 Research facilities When the EU started to develop its own European Programme on CIP (EPCIP), it had to detail and specify its definition of CI. The European Commission definition offered in the 2006 Directive Proposal states that “Critical Infrastructure means those assets or parts thereof which are essential for the maintenance of critical societal functions, including the supply chain, health, safety, security, economic or social well-being of people” (Commission 2006a, p. 15). This definition is added with a specification of the sectors concerned. Compared to the US approach, the EU definition seems to be even wider and more complex, as depicted in Table 3 (Commission 2006a, Annex 1, p.21). However, as most of the 18 NORDREGIO REPORT 2007:5
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION CI should be taken care of and protected by the Member States, only those CI that can be clearly identified as ‘European’ should be covered by the EPCIP. There was a lively discussion about how to define the ‘Europeaness’ of a CI. How many countries should be involved? How should one define the severity of European level disturbances if these ECI collapse or come under attack? Should the infrastructure be located in the EU area or could some CI outside the Union be CI for the EU and, if so, what would it entail? In any case, the current Directive Proposal defines ECI as follows: “’European Critical Infrastructure’ (ECI) means critical infrastructures which disruption or destruction would significantly affect two or more Member States, or a single Member State if the critical infrastructure is located in another Member State. This includes effects resulting from cross-sector dependencies on other types of infrastructure.” (Commission 2006a, p. 15) CI definitions in the BSR If we take a look at the BSR countries, we see that their CIP terminology and definitions do not usually follow the US, NATO or EU terminology precisely. Some countries follow their own longer-term traditions and solutions adapted to new circumstances. In many BST countries the contemporary CI concept is based on the traditional total defence or civil defence systems that were built up during the Cold War. 13 In other countries, CI-related issues were simply seen as a part of the general national emergency management system and contingency plans. It has been possible to develop these systems towards crisis management systems that take into account other types of threats and emergency situations that did not figure much on the previous agenda. The degree of sophistication of CIP strategies and their respective definitions vary in BSR countries. In general, the Nordic countries and Germany have welldeveloped and detailed strategies; while in some countries CIP-related issues are dealt with within more general national security concepts or strategies, or then more developed CIP strategies are currently in the process of being developed. 14 In order to depict the general features – similarities, differences, trends – of the 13 ‘Total defence’ usually refers to the need to take all the following five defence dimensions into account: military defence, economic defence, civil defence, social defence, and psychological defence. 14 One could say that the Nordic countries and Germany have rather specific CIP strategies, whereas the Baltic States, Poland and Russia have included these issues, to various degrees and sophistication, in their national security strategies. In Poland, a “National Plan for Critical Infrastructure Protection” is soon to be published, see: Interministerial meeting concerning critical infrastructure (2007) and Meeting with critical infrastructure operators (2007). For some of the other BSR countries not discussed here, see the “National Security Concept of the Republic of Latvia” (2002); “National Security Strategy of the Republic of Lithuania” (2002/2005); for Denmark, see National Sårbarhedsrapport (2006), Et robust og sikkert samfund Regeringens politik for beredskabet i Danmark (2005), OECD (2006); Russia’s strategies are best expressed in the “Doctrine of the Information Security of the Russian Federation” (2000) and “National Security Concept of the Russian Federation” (2000), of which the first one especially can be seen as relevant as it focuses on CII. For Russia, see also Abele-Wigert and Dunn (2006). NORDREGIO REPORT 2007:5 19
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