Towards a Baltic Sea Region Strategy in Critical ... - Helsinki.fi

CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION IN THE BALTIC SEA REGION
More reliable electric power systems
The current goal is to reduce the recovery time to six hours, even during
exceptional circumstances. The current network structure does not support this, as
noted earlier.
There are several ways of reducing the interruption time following major
storms. The most efficient one is to replace the aerial lines with underground
cables, to some extent. This makes the network less vulnerable to most weather
phenomena; however, as it has been pointed out earlier in the text, it also makes
repairing of damages significantly slower. Class I and II storms do not require the
entire network to be replaced, class III on the other hand, does.
Another way of reducing interruption time is by increasing the service
personnel. This is a possible solution when dealing with class I storms and to some
extent when dealing with class II. However, for class III storms this is not a viable
option.
There are also smaller and less expensive ways of improving the power
delivery safety. Non-tree-proof wire paths can be improved by cutting all the
branches on the inside of the path, forcing the trees to fall away from the path due
to e.g. heavy snow masses.
Aerial lines due for renewal should whenever possible be moved from the
forests to the sides of the roads. This reduces the risk of the lines being damaged
by falling trees and makes it easier for service personnel to reach the damaged
spots.
Regardless of all investments in electricity networks and their better
reliability continuous electricity supply cannot be guaranteed. If production or
other activities need continuous electricity supply, must the customer himself take
the actions to secure continuous electricity supply?
Better resilience
Even if the primary point of view of this research was electricity network – critical
infrastructure – protection, in the conclusion of the research, there are many
elements of improving critical infrastructure resilience (CIR) 47 like having readymade
plans of how and when personnel should be called in or put in stand-by,
keeping maps up to date, following weather forecasts, making deals with third
parties for providing spare parts and additional equipment, cooperation with the
emergency services, etc. The down time can be significantly reduced by increasing
preparedness.
The storm classification and the mathematical model in each category also
give a good solid foundation to build up a common knowledge on extreme long
electricity blackouts to all parties involved. In the future the information from
building information system and information from electricity network simulation
model should be combined and so we will have more detailed information what
consequences possible extreme long electricity blackout have on activities in
different type of buildings. This way we can find out vulnerable activities, such as
telecommunication nodes, waterworks, and sewage farms or vulnerable groups in
buildings such as hospitals, nursing homes for older people, schools, day-care
47 See the discussion on resilience or CIR in Chapter I: Introduction 1.5.
80 NORDREGIO REPORT 2007:5