Towards a Baltic Sea Region Strategy in Critical ... - Helsinki.fi

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CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION IN THE BALTIC SEA REGION location registers and authentication centre (AUC) that need to be protected. For instance, a failure of the AUC may result in the loss of call setup capabilities. Survivability of databases may be implemented by switching over to standby databases that are continuously updated with data from the primary databases. Security and Protection of Physical Infrastructure Security measures are also essential to prevent unauthorized physical access by potential threat actors to equipment at TETRA cell tower sites, MSC facilities and Command & Control Centre premises. Intruders can be kept away from these locations by using perimeter fences topped with barbed wire, cages, bomb-proof buildings, bunkers, solid steel doors and so forth. Moreover, security of the infrastructure locations can be enhanced round-the-clock monitoring using remote surveillance using CCTV cameras or by having security personnel physically present at the locations. The former is more suitable for cell site surveillance due to the relatively large number cell sites typically present in a network. The aforementioned measures also address the security of the network operations personnel based in those locations. Further protection is also provided against man-made and natural hazards by reinforcing telehousing facilities, fitting smoke detectors, temperature sensors, air filtering systems, flood proofing and providing back-up battery power. TETRA assessment using ITU-T X.805 security architecture This subsection assesses typical TETRA network security features and protection mechanisms, using the modular approach of the ITU-T X.805 security architecture. This is not meant to be an exhaustive listing of security features or a TETRA network, but rather indicative of the some of the common security measures that could be undertaken by an operator. It should be noted that some of the security measures are interdependent, and may have some overlapping functionality. Modules 4 to 6 The TETRA network’s service layer security measures addressed in the management, control and end-user planes (Modules 4-6) are summarized in Table 11. Modules 1 to 3 The TETRA network’s infrastructure layer security measures addressed in the management, control and end-user planes (Modules 1-3) are summarized in Table 10. Modules 7 to 9 The TETRA network’s application layer security measures addressed in the management, control and end-user planes (Modules 7-9) are summarized in Table 12. 118 NORDREGIO REPORT 2007:5
CHAPTER III: INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY Table III—10 TETRA network security measures addressed in Modules 1-3 of the ITU-T X.805 security architecture. Module Module 1: Infrastructure layer, management plane Module 2: Infrastructure layer, control plane Module 3: Infrastructure layer, end-user plane Security Measures • Only authorized personnel with administration rights granted access to element or network management systems to perform network management activities remotely or via a craft port • Maintenance of a log (e.g., system log, audit trails etc.) of all management actions or events • Protection of configuration information and administrative IDs/passwords from unauthorized viewing, diversion, deletion or modification • OTAR and/or OTAK secure encryption key management • Backup content and protect connectivity to user management databases • Error-correction coding 77 to ensure the correct delivery of information carried over the control channel 78 • Encryption of signalling information over the air interface (AIE) • Archive recording of all control room traffic for later playback • Protection of fixed signalling network links • Error-correction coding to ensure the correct delivery of information carried over the traffic channel 79 • Compression and protection of user speech traffic by using speech encoding 80 • One way and/or mutual authentication between the MS and SwMI, to verify the terminal and legitimacy of the network • Remotely disabling of compromised MS equipment or subscription • User logon by keying in a Personal Identification Number (PIN) or sending a Radio User Identity (RUI) 77 Error correction codes employed in TETRA systems include block codes, rate-compatible punctured convolutional codes (for phase modulation) and turbo codes (for QAM). See also ETSI EN (2007b) and ETSI TR (2007). 78 TETRA’s control channel (CCH) is used to carry signalling messages and packet data (ETSI EN 2007b). 79 TETRA’s traffic channel (TCH) is used to carry speech and circuit-switched data (ETSI EN 2007b). 80 TETRA networks use Algebraic Code Excited Linear Prediction (ACELP) encoding. TETRA Air Interface (ETSI EN 2007b). See also ETSI TR (2007). NORDREGIO REPORT 2007:5 119
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Towards a Baltic Sea Region Strateg
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Nordregio Report 2007:5 ISSN 1403-2
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5.4 Impacts caused by terrorism, na
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CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION
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PREFACE PREFACE With the Commission
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PREFACE The study includes tens of
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION CHAPTER I:
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CHAPTER II: ELECTRICITY 2 ELECTRIC
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CHAPTER VI: WATER CHAPTER VI: WATER
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