Towards a Baltic Sea Region Strategy in Critical ... - Helsinki.fi

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CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION IN THE BALTIC SEA REGION 4.3 RISK EVALUATION Risk perceptions of the Finnish, Estonian and Russian maritime authorities Close-calls and accidents in maritime transport are not new phenomena in the Gulf of Finland. This is due to the challenging geographical conditions of the sea, difficult weather conditions in the winter time and increasing traffic. However, the Baltic Sea Region (BSR) and especially the Gulf of Finland can be determined as a fairly low risk area from safety (accidents) and security (terrorism) viewpoints, so far with only minor-scale incidents. There have e.g. never been any terrorist strikes in the area (during the time of the modern states of Estonia, Finland and Russia), neither have there been large oil accidents. The biggest catastrophe in the Baltic Sea happened in the 1994 when the passenger ferry MV Estonia sunk near the Finnish coast due to a technical failure. Despite the still ongoing discussion about the possibility of terrorist-related cause in the sinking of ship, it is the consensus in the area, expressed in the evaluations made by Maritime Authorities (MA) of the respective countries, that guaranteeing the safety enhancing procedures of vessel traffic in the Gulf of Finland is far more important than security-related procedures. This study uses published material as a background against which the risk perceptions of the interviewed marine specialists, representing the MA and related institutions of Finland, Estonia and Russia respectively 108 , are compared. Identification of risks, or what is at risk, is always contextually and culturally specific. In this case, despite culturally and politically representing different contexts, interviewees all belong to the same professional reference group. Each of them has a maritime background in terms of education and practical work, subsequently accompanied by experiencies in marine traffic control. The following sections will elucidate the safety risks that rise from the views of marine authorities when they were asked about the risks. We have tried to analyse this qualitative data bearing in mind that the conceptions of the interviewees should not be taken as fact, but as personal, though professional, views about the vessel traffic safety (and security) situation in the Gulf. Naturally, these views are formed and moulded by the personal and professional histories of the interviewed MA. The risks in the Baltic Sea can be described as cross-border ones. One definition describes a cross-border risk as a potential civic and systemic risk that 108 The authors are most thankful to the following people who kindly agreed to be interviewed for this study: Matti Aaltonen, Director, Vessel traffic management, Finnish Maritime Authority, 6.6.2007 in Helsinki; Kari Kosonen, Vice director, Vessel traffic management, Finnish Maritime Authority, 6.6.2007 in Helsinki, and 25.9.2007 by telephone; Rein Haavel, VTS Project Office Manager, Cybernetica Ltd., 7.6.2007 in Tallinn; Are Piel, Head of Vessel Traffic Services Department, Estonian Maritime Authority, 7.6.2007 in Tallinn; René Sirol, Deputy Director General, Head of Maritime Safety Division, Estonian Maritime Authority, 7.6.2007 in Tallinn; Ivan Gotovchits, Head of Regional Vessel Traffic Service, Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation, State Enterprise “ROSMORPORT”, St. Petersburg’s branch, (answers to an e-mail questionnaire received) 31.8.2007; Vladimir Vasilyev, Deputy Director/Associate Professor, Safety of Navigation and Radio Communication, Central Marine Research and Design Institute, (answers to an e-mail questionnaire received) 22.8.2007. 150 NORDREGIO REPORT 2007:5
CHAPTER IV: OIL TRANSPORTATION AND MARITIME SAFETY affects more than one country by creating potential or actual losses across governmental borders (Hellenberg and Hedin 2006, p. 8). Excessive environmental risks The narrow and shallow geographical conditions of the Gulf of Finland sea area make it a high-level risk zone. The traffic volume is high its central parts, in international water, where the lanes of ‘the motorway of the seas’ are located. Despite the heavy use of the sea as a transport route, the Gulf of Finland is not seen solely as a traffic route, but as an area of important cultural heritage and environmental value. The Baltic Sea is environmentally vulnerable and has been identified as the Particularly Sensitive Sea Area (PSSA) by International Maritime Organization (IMO) in 2005: “A Particularly Sensitive Sea Area (PSSA) is an area that needs special protection through action by IMO because of its significance for recognized ecological or socio-economic or scientific reasons and which may be vulnerable to damage by international maritime activities.” This means for example, that the estimation for the renewal of the water of the Baltic Sea is approximately 25-20 years, which causes pollutants to remain in the water for a long time. Even if there is common understanding that on a daily basis most of the pollution in the Baltic Sea is derived from the surrounding land areas, a routine ship operation inflicts pollution too. For example, WWF Finland released a study according to which at present only 13 out of the 50 shipping companies are committed to proper treatment of sewage (WWF Finland 2007b). All the states at the Baltic Sea area are included except the Russian Federation. Despite the shared will of all the Baltic Sea States to protect the Baltic Sea, there are differences in how the countries’ representatives perceive and value the state of the environment of the Baltic Sea, and why its protection is considered important. Estonia’s worries about an oil accident are understandable, because Estonia currently lacks equipment to collect spilt oil from the sea. Then again, the country to suffer most from an oil accident would probably be Finland, since the prevailing winds and sea currents in the Gulf of Finland area would divert oil pollution to the Finnish archipelago and the long Finnish coastline. In addition, despite what magnitudes of oil pollution combating equipment a country or region possesses, the consequences of a 100,000 ton oil tanker accident, if all of the oil were to be released, would be devastating for the whole Gulf of Finland and the Baltic Sea in general. At least one aspect of the Russian view comes from the fact that even if it has signed, it has not ratified e.g. the convention regarding the environmental protection of the Baltic Sea, the so-called “Espoo Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context” from 1991 (EC EIA 1991). A specific high-level risk: Wintertime ice conditions Oil transportation has to be guaranteed all the year round and their importance is highlighted in winter, when weather conditions are at their most challenging. The Gulf of Finland freezes each year, which demands a special design and construction of the vessels intended to sail in the Baltic all the year round.. Tanker traffic is faced with the challenges caused by the ice thickness, as well as the NORDREGIO REPORT 2007:5 151
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Towards a Baltic Sea Region Strateg
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Nordregio Report 2007:5 ISSN 1403-2
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5.4 Impacts caused by terrorism, na
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CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION
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PREFACE PREFACE With the Commission
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PREFACE The study includes tens of
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION CHAPTER I:
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CHAPTER II: ELECTRICITY 2 ELECTRIC
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