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CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION IN THE BALTIC SEA REGION Lithuania, Norway and Poland are members. Finland and Sweden are active participants in NATO’s Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and Partnership of Peace (PfP) programme, and through that participate in the organization’s CIPpolicies; the same goes for Russia, which however prefers to work through the separate Russia-NATO Council. These basic categories of the BSR countries’ participation in the main international organizations in the region are summarised by Table 1. However, an important refinement to this situation is that there exists a great number of intergovernmental or transnational organizations, institutions, networks, and programmes at the regional level in the BSR, most of them dealing with this or that part of CIP by any definition. This issue is discussed in some detail further on in this introductory chapter. Table I—1 BSR countries and their participation in the EU and NATO. BSR country Organization Denmark Estonia Finland Germany Latvia Iceland Lithuania Norway Poland Russia Sweden PCA EU x x x x x EEA Schengen x EEA Schengen x Four Common Spaces ENPI, INTERRE G Northern Dimension x NATO x x EAPC & PfP x x x x x x NATO- Russia Council (EAPC & PfP) EAPC & PfP 1.3 WHAT ARE CRITICAL INFRASTUCTURES? The literature on CI – and on the seemingly ever-growing number of closely related concepts – forms a large body of official national documents, international organizations’ documents, as well as independent researchers’ and institutions’ handbooks and studies. Should we start to compare the national CIP and related systems (e.g. International CEP Handbook 2006; Abele-Wigert and Dunn 2006), we would soon realise that the basic approaches, and together with them the basic definitions, of the fundamental concepts vary significantly across the countries and the exact context, though they have much in common. The concept of CI has also had different meanings at different times. In analytic and academic literature, we can find a wide range of definitions. In surveying some of these definitions, which become broader and broader, Egan (2007, p. 5) however notices that: “These definitions aside, even the broadest of CI 14 NORDREGIO REPORT 2007:5
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION systems seem to be expanding.” One main reason for this, Egan argues, is that in modern societies there exists set of systems “that are not part of the CI in their current state but which may be in the years to come.” In this section, we discuss some relevant official definitions of CI in the comparative perspectives of the United States, NATO, the EU, and the BSR countries. We may find that though these definitions and typologies overlap, they are also in many ways different in their exact understandings of what are the critical sectors and also in more fundamental perspective about what to focus on in their strategies. However, a general trend seems to be that while infrastructures or CI were perhaps earlier understood as something very stable and concrete, either physical or information and communication technology systems, there seems to be a trend towards a broad, holistic understanding of CI, where it is understood as networks or systems of vital functions of the society as a whole or the infrastructures embedded in these functions. United States’ definition of CI The development of the definition of CI in the United States illustrates the expansion of the concept. Moteff et al. (2003) have analysed the US debate and official documents since 1980s to the current post-9/11 Homeland Security era. While they notice that before CI became a term used in security debates, public policymakers commonly used the seemingly similar term ‘infrastructure’ as an object to be protected. However, in those early debates the concern often was the issue of ‘natural’ long-term deterioration and erosion of the important infrastructures and the need for more public funding to modernise them. When the issue became more about the ‘vulnerability’ or ‘criticality’ of those infrastructures in case of security-related rather sudden events, the criteria for an infrastructure to be judged critical became that it must be vital to one or several broad national functions. The 1997 President’s Commission defined infrastructures as mostly the privately-owned ‘basic foundations’ for society. The report stated that: “By infrastructure we mean more than just a collection of individual companies, engaged in related activities; we mean a networks of independent, mostly privately owned, man-made systems and processes that function collaboratively and synergistically to produce and distribute a continuous flow of essential goods and services” (PCCIP 1997, p. 3). Moteff et al. (2003) argue that the set and number of those sectors, infrastructures or functions defined as critical or vital have been variables. Indeed, the President’s Commission 1997 focused in its report on eight infrastructures “whose incapacity or destruction would have a debilitating impact on our defence and economic security”. These eight infrastructures were telecommunication, electric power systems, natural gas and oil, banking and finance, transportation, water supply systems, government services and emergency services. (PCCIP 1997, Appendix 1.) A year later, the definition was broadened and infrastructure was defined as the framework of interdependent networks and systems comprising identifiable industries, institutions (including people and procedures), and distribution NORDREGIO REPORT 2007:5 15
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