Towards a Baltic Sea Region Strategy in Critical ... - Helsinki.fi

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CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION IN THE BALTIC SEA REGION 3.3 COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY FOR CIIP The challenge of CIIP has garnered sufficient attention to warrant high level research and in-depth studies by government, businesses, industry experts and academia. This work has resulted in some early understanding of the concept of CIIP and the possible scope of its challenge, as illustrated by the International CIIP 2006 Handbooks (Abele-Wigert and Dunn 2006; Dunn and Mauer 2006). The CIIP challenge stems from the fact that CIIP strategists are usually faced with an abundant and diverse set of complex interdependent scenarios. This may leave different strategy-makers lacking clarity and coherence in achieving what are usually common CIIP goals. Moreover, it increases the likelihood of wasting resources, time and effort by focusing on imperfectly perceived alternatives. The worst-case scenario is of different groupings (private, public or a combination of both) developing different, contradictory and ineffective responses to a universal CIIP challenge. A comprehensive strategy for CIIP aims to avoid those pitfalls by providing CIIP implementers with coherent direction, guidance and focus when faced with a multitude of complex choices. Strategy is in general a rather elusive and abstract concept. The difficulty in formulating a CIIP strategy is further accentuated by the continuous infrastructure scalability, rapid evolution and constant diffusion of innovations within the information infrastructure. Such a fast-paced technological environment necessitates strategy that is both dynamic and adaptable to changes that occur regularly over time (Duke Corporate Education 2005). Future strategy tends to build upon existing CIIP goals (the end result) and strategy (the means to an end). Figure 25 depicts how a shift in priorities of different groups may force a change in goals and strategy, and how these are then mapped to different dimensions of each group. This strategic context enables a greater sense of purpose by linking activities of different groups to the bigger picture of CIIP. The next subsections provide an overview of strategy within the different CIIP dimensions shown in Figure 25. Figure III—25 Continuous lifecycle of strategy on CIIP. 124 NORDREGIO REPORT 2007:5
CHAPTER III: INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY Political dimension Policies have traditionally resulted from governments’ decision to act (or not to act) upon a certain issue, typically in the interest of the general citizenry. For instance, Jenkins defines policy as “a set of interrelated decisions taken by a political actor or group of actors concerning the selection of goals and the means of achieving them within a specified situation where those decisions should, in principle, be within the power of those actors to achieve” (Jenkins 1978). Rauscher extends the definition of policy to include agreements, standards, policies, and regulations, as well as the framework within which different actors interact (Rauscher et al 2006). The US government was one of the first public institutions to formally address the challenge of CIP and developed a national protection strategy under the auspices of the Presidential Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP) in 1996 (Executive Order 1996). The efforts of the PCCIP and subsequent commissions resulted in key government policies on CIIP outlining a range of underlying factors (e.g., organizational, legislative, regulatory). The CIP/CIIP initiatives pioneered by the US government have since been adapted in other countries, albeit with varying interpretations of the challenge and recommended approaches. These differences are clearly noticeable in Volume I of the International CIIP 2006 Handbook that collates a survey of the CIIP policies of 20 countries (Abele-Wigert and Dunn 2006). 81 Moreover, the cross-sector nature of CIIP has meant that multiple agencies (public security, emergency, lawenforcement etc.) working under the same government have tackled the issue of CIIP from different vantage points, with each introducing unique perspectives on the CIIP policymaking process. Abele-Wigert identifies the co-existence of technical (system-level), business, law-enforcement and national security perspectives on CIIP in most surveyed countries, though the prominence of a particular perspective may vary from country to country (Abele- Figure III—26 A holistic approach to CIIP policy Wigert 2006). Furthermore, the making. author notes that applying a holistic approach in CIIP policy making would result in policy that is more effective than the one resulting from sum of the individual perspectives (Abele- 81 The survey includes profiles of CIIP policies from three BSR countries: Sweden, Finland and Germany. NORDREGIO REPORT 2007:5 125
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Towards a Baltic Sea Region Strateg
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Nordregio Report 2007:5 ISSN 1403-2
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CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION
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PREFACE PREFACE With the Commission
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CHAPTER VI: WATER CHAPTER VI: WATER
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