Towards a Baltic Sea Region Strategy in Critical ... - Helsinki.fi

CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION
degree of regulation. Russia, for instance, is clearly more regulative in terms of its
economic sectors, and although privatisation has been allowed in most economic
areas within the framework of the Russian market economy, the Russian state has
to be able to retain control over the key areas. For this reason the ‘sensitive’ fields
remain difficult to open up to far reaching liberalisation or foreign ownership such
that the strategic level of decision-making would move beyond the reach of the
Russian state. (Liuhto 2007)
Another extreme is perhaps Estonia, which is often said to have implemented
its economic post-socialist reform in 1990s through ‘shock therapy’, and which
was “partly accomplished through adopting legislation based on liberal or limited
regulation of the economy, thus depriving the bureaucracy of opportunities to
intervene or easily undermine the foundation of new companies” (Laar 2007).
Indeed, in Estonia’s counter-terrorism strategy it is stated - with the hint that some
new regulative or cooperative PPP efforts will be perhaps adopted – as follows:
“Protection of critical infrastructures that are in the possession of legal entities
under private law is not regulated by the state. It is necessary to define objects
under high risk of attack and critical infrastructure at the state level and establish
principles for organization of their protection.” (Fundamentals of Counterterrorism
in Estonia 2006, article 3.6)
Sweden, in turn, has been characterised by “a substantial amount of mixed
ownership of […] critical infrastructures” and consequently a “great deal of
government regulation has been accepted” (Lukasik et al. 2003, 79).
These differences become important when forming CIP strategies in the
region, as each country seems to need more or less tailored solutions to the exact
forms of the PPP.
1.8 EU AND MEMBER STATES – FINDING THE RIGHT
BALANCE
As was seen above, the national models of CIP differ from that of the EPCIP at
least in definitions and typologies but perhaps even in a more fundamental sense,
such as whether the focus should be on protection or reliance/functionality, for
instance. Several recent analyses of EPCIP, such as Fritzon et al. (2007, p. 39),
have noted that there are actually “considerable uncertainties” in key areas of
policy development and institutional design of the EPCIP and it in fact “is best
described as a work in progress” and it is in fact “less a ‘program’ than a plan for a
program.” Fritzon et al. criticize moreover that the EPCIP “although noble in
intention, lacks a broad ‘vision’ or philosophy on addressing CIP.”
While this might be too strong and unfair a statement – a lot of work and
thought has indeed been put into the EPCIP – it is legitimate to raise the question
of how to find the right balance between the broader national and more limited
European definitions and efforts, and how to define the division of labour between
different levels?
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