Towards a Baltic Sea Region Strategy in Critical ... - Helsinki.fi

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CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION IN THE BALTIC SEA REGION • Impact on fish stocks and bird life • Alteration of the seabed • Dumped munitions and ship wrecks These are mainly related to the construction phase of the pipeline, and in this case the impact is limited in time. Concerning biota, the greatest concern is the impact on fish-stocks and on bird species due to disturbance during the construction of the pipeline. The seabed could be negatively influenced by necessary construction works, dredging, filling and blasting. Sediments could be disturbed as well as local sea currents. Fine sediments could be shifted abroad; harmful substances contained in the sediment could be released. The comments (especially from Finnish authorities) to the proposed Environmental Assessment show clearly that there are substantial concerns. Finnish authorities therefore wish to model long-term risks mainly connected to sedimentation and the release of harmful substances to better evaluate associated risks. Concerning chemical weapons, the project “Modelling Ecological Risks related to Sea-dumped Chemical Weapons” (MERCW) is being carried out within the 6th Framework Program by the Finnish Institute of Marine Research. No final results are yet available. Another issue that up to now cannot be fully judged is the question of conventional munitions and release of harmful substances such as heavy metals from corroded bombs. It seems that the possible environmental impacts have not yet been assessed sufficiently, and it may be assumed that the construction of the pipeline will alter environmental conditions. On the basis of available information it cannot be said whether the construction of the pipeline will have indirect effects, such as enhancing the corrosion of chemical and conventional munitions leading to a faster release of toxic or harmful substances. It is also unclear how the warfare agents will behave once set free in larger proportions. 5.5 CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION STRATEGY Although the probability of attacks and natural disasters that could harm the NEGP is rather low, the effect of this could be substantial taken the importance of the pipeline (the NEGP will provide 8% of the total European gas demand) and the side effects concerning dumped munitions. Therefore, in a Critical Infrastructure Protection strategy (CIP strategy) hazard scenarios should be described and responsibilities for prevention and mitigation of the hazards should be defined. In case of the NEGP the CIP Strategy should address following issues: • Securing the NEGP against trawling and anchoring vessels. • Safeguarding of the most vulnerable parts of the NEGP (landfalls in Vyborg and Lubmin as well as the service platform). • Emergency response and repair of damage to the pipeline. • Avoidance of side effects of building and running the NEGP related to dumped munitions. 182 NORDREGIO REPORT 2007:5
CHAPTER V: GAS Political dimension Even if the NEGP is seen as a private sector activity, its strategic role in gas supply for the European gas market and the fact that it runs through the EEZ of five Baltic Sea states makes it a political issue. Several individual issues have been raised, which create conflicts. Thus, the plan of Nord Stream to erect a service platform next to the Swedish island of Gotland followed an intensive public debate in Sweden. A major concern was possible intelligence collection by Russia. This debate was fed by a statement by Vladimir Putin who said in a TV interview that the Russian fleet’s “role is to protect our economic interests in the Baltic Sea region […] Protecting the Northern European Pipeline, which brings energy resources to our Western European customers, is one of our most important priorities” (quoted from Pursiainen 2007). Later, Nord Stream has tried to build confidence especially as to the use and protection of the service platform by stating that “in case any surveillance is needed, it is the responsibility of no one else but the Swedish Coast Guard” (Nord Stream 2007b). Major concerns about the NEGP have been expressed by Poland, whose Minister of Defence stated that “Poland has a particular sensitivity to corridors and deals above its head. That was the Locarno tradition and the Molotov-Ribbentrop tradition. That was the 20th century. We don’t want any repetition of that” (quoted from Pursiainen 2007). The importance of the issue is shown by the fact that the Polish parliament (Sejm) organised an international conference in May 2007 to discuss the issue with experts (International Conference on Environmental Threats to the Baltic Sea, Warsaw, 28 May 2007). It is important that those states affected by the NEGP would find a common ground at the political level. Even if the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 113 clearly states that the pipeline operation should not be impeded, additional efforts about the relevant security issues are needed. Institutional dimension Nord Stream is responsible for operating the NEGP and principally Nord Stream should have highest interest in developing and implementing a CIP strategy for NEGP in order to avoid economic losses. To avoid these losses, it has to be assumed that Nord Stream will take care of detecting pipeline damage continuously and the fast repair of damaged parts of the pipeline. More complicated is the field of safeguarding and complex reactions in emergency responses that might be necessary in rare cases. Even if the risks mentioned above are low, the safeguarding of a pipeline that crosses the Baltic Sea at a length of 1,200 km is a multinational task. There must be a sound strategy developed together with experts from the affected states that concentrates on crucial points such as landfalls or pressure stations. 111 UNCLOS; Article 210: According to UNCLOS, pollution resulting from dumping shall be prevented by the responsible coastal state. Article 79: According to UNCLOS, all states are entitled to lay pipelines on continental shelf, coastal states may not impede the laying or maintenance of such cables or pipelines NORDREGIO REPORT 2007:5 183
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Towards a Baltic Sea Region Strateg
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Nordregio Report 2007:5 ISSN 1403-2
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5.4 Impacts caused by terrorism, na
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CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION
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PREFACE PREFACE With the Commission
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PREFACE The study includes tens of
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION CHAPTER I:
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CHAPTER II: ELECTRICITY 2 ELECTRIC
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