Towards a Baltic Sea Region Strategy in Critical ... - Helsinki.fi

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CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION IN THE BALTIC SEA REGION Green Paper options The EPCIP Green Paper (Commission 2005b) was a rather open and democratic process (although a rather hasty one), as it was produced in order to encourage discussion on the issues among all interested parties and stakeholders, such as Member States, owners and operators of infrastructures, and professional associations. It also seemed, at least formally, to open most, if not all, of the issues at stake to a genuine choice between the possible policy alternatives, such as that between the terrorism-as-priority approach vs. all-hazards approach discussed above. The Green Paper proposed that EPCIP framework could function on a voluntary or mandatory basis. However, it clearly took the party of the latter in stating that only a legal framework would ensure a consistent and homogeneous implementation of CIP measures and establish clear responsibilities between the Member States and the Commission. Therefore a voluntary approach is in a sense already precluded in the Commission Green Paper. The main goal in EPCIP is foremost to unify the definition of CIP by creating a common list of CI sectors, harmonize the system of the CIP in each country, ensure the protection on adequate and equal levels, avoid any negative crossborder effects the disruption or destruction of infrastructure in one Member State might have, and ensure that the rules of competition are not distorted within the EU internal market. This would be realized by constant monitoring and control. In addition to already existing sector specific approaches, EPCIP would offer a horizontal dimension to complement the sector-based approach. The methods used would be exchanging best practices and compliance monitoring mechanisms as well as setting common objectives, standards, codes and methodologies. In defining CI the Green Paper proposed methods to separate national critical infrastructures (NCI or CI) from European critical infrastructures (ECI) by determining their cross border effect. The existing bilateral CIP cooperation would be complementary to the EPCIP and the ECI could be seen as involving either two or more Member States including relevant bilateral CI, or three or more Member States excluding all bilateral CI. This definition would be done on a sector-specific basis together with the Member States taking account of any potential security gaps or interdependencies. However it is stated in the Green Paper that identifying any infrastructure as ECI would not require any additional protection measures but instead solely bilateral agreements could exclude the Community. CI originating outside EU should also be taken into consideration – although the Green Paper does not elaborate this issue – as well as the interdependencies between the ECI. Regarding the national CI the Green Paper saw a common European framework of protection as being particularly useful, since nowadays the majority of companies operate across borders. EPCIP would not only simplify matter for companies but also avoid them from additional costs. Here the Commission proposes the following alternatives: to integrate NCI fully within EPCIP; to leave NCI outside the scope of EPCIP; or to leave it fully up to Member States to decide whether to use parts of EPCIP in relation to NCI. In addition the Green Paper suggested either to have a single overseeing body or a national point of contact dealing with the implementation of EPCIP but leaves this issue open for discussion among the stakeholders. 40 NORDREGIO REPORT 2007:5
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION As for the implementation of ECI the Commission suggested Member States to take the lead on it (e.g. in formulating identification criteria, setting up the priority sectors and minimum protection measures), together with the CI owners, operators and users. In addition their role would be in notifying of the critical nature of the infrastructure to a specific CIP body, appointing a Security Liaison Officer to work in between of the relevant bodies (owner/operator and CIP body), starting up and following an operator security plan with permanent and graduated security measures and participating in planning of civil protection. The Green Paper suggested several key principles: subsidiarity emphasizing the national responsibility and giving the Commission floor only in the cases with EU cross border effect complementarity utilizing existing structures and measures in CIP; confidentiality accentuating the delicate nature of information relating to national CIP; stakeholder cooperation giving all relevant parties role in cooperation and contribution to CIP in all levels, although leaving the leadership to Member State authorities; proportionality applying appropriate protection measures focusing on areas of greatest risk and taking into account the cost-benefit ratio. The EPCIP would also need supporting measures such as the CIWIN for which the Green Paper suggested three options. It could either work as a forum focused on the exchange of CIP ideas and best practices for the CI owners and operators where the Commission would gather and disseminate the relevant information; as a rapid alert system (RAS) of the immediate threats linking the national level to EU level; or as a combination of the previous two, that is, a communication and alert system however each having its own role. CIWIN should be complementary to the existing networks and avoid overlapping as well as offer harmonized methodology for classifying the alert levels and threats that now vary widely in different Member States. 29 It is suggested that the overall evaluation and monitoring of the programme be done as a comprehensive process covering all stakeholders and levels of action (EU, national). The options proposed are: to establish a peer evaluation mechanism for the Member States and Commission to work together; have the Commission report yearly on the progress made; or have the evaluation and monitoring done nationally where the CIP body would monitor the EPCIP implementation. The comments of different Member States on the Green Paper are not provided from the Commission “due to the sensitivity of the CIP issues involved (security concerns).” The information from the Commission stated that the Member States and most of the industry involved in the in the Green Paper consultation process specifically asked the Commission not to disclose the 29 The EU CIWIN system would be rather similar to the United States equivalent, CWIN – Critical Infrastructure Warning Information Network that was initiated in 2005 (ODP Information Bulletin 2005) and works under the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). CWIN works as a tool allowing communication between state and local government, other federal agencies, private sector and international organizations in case of primary methods of communication being unavailable (US DHA 2006). However, it is still unclear whether this would be the purpose of European CIWIN as well, to work as a type of urgent emergency line. NORDREGIO REPORT 2007:5 41
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CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION
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PREFACE PREFACE With the Commission
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