Towards a Baltic Sea Region Strategy in Critical ... - Helsinki.fi

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CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION IN THE BALTIC SEA REGION However, by building safety procedures and systems like those currently existing systems discussed in the case study, it is possible to cover only part of the ‘safety menu’ needed for a safe Gulf of Finland. The above- mentioned systems and procedures can diminish the risks entailed by growing tanker traffic but it would not eliminate them. Risk related to human factors and in many cases to the level of professionalism of ship crews, remains at about 20 % of all risks, despite what procedural and technical measures are taken. Another much discussed issue is the need of a driving licence ‘ice passport’. Solving the problem of navigating in dangerous ice conditions needs both political and technical responses and solutions. The view of the maritime authorities is that the specific geographical context of the Gulf of Finland is not thoroughly understood by the European Union authorities, or by the International Maritime Organization. The most worrying issue is not the quality of tonnage, as it was few years ago, but the quality and numbers of personnel onboard the ships. However, having a well-qualified crew is a costly business for shipping companies who may decide to prioritize their expenses differently. Practitioner-level functional cooperation remains important. Neither safety nor security can be achieved through a one-size fits all approach. It is worth of considering too whether it can be achieved regionally. Despite common goals, safety and especially security measures remain issues that emphasize the sovereign and national decision-making in the globalised world. The case study shows that issues of sovereignty still dominate at the higher political level, but that at the more practical, lower administrative level they do not create an obstacle to deepening cooperation. Considering the risks present in the Gulf of Finland, high marks are due for the cooperation carried out. On such a heavily used sea with high probability of oil accident, the risks are being handled exceptionally well. However, there is a need for political decisions and commitment on the level of International Maritime Organization and European Union, to give a mandate for safety cooperation to evolve further. This mandate would enhance the adoption of existing technical solutions to battle the risks of growing vessel traffic. This is necessary because it is probable that the volume of oil transports will double by 2015. A larger volume of oil transported through the Gulf of Finland will not cause a problem in itself because the size of the ships will increase. But a traffic situation with more and bigger vessels has to be controlled in a much more profound way than is the case today. However, the authors of the case study argue that it would be too simplistic to think that cross-border action only at the level of practitioners is enough. It is important to raise the issues to the international as well as national agendas and get binding instruments e.g. in the environmental protection issues. This should be done in the same cooperative spirit as the operational cooperation. Russia as a central player in the Gulf of Finland and as a global great power wants all decisions to go through the International Maritime Organization, thus emphasising the United Nations system rather than the European Union-Russia system. However, in most cases when Finland and Estonia have tried to operate the system according to European Union directives, Russia has not been reluctant to cooperate. This potential barrier to cooperation has been avoided thanks to good personal contacts with the Russian authorities. XXIV NORDREGIO REPORT 2007:5
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The case study concludes that all in all, the Gulf of Finland countries should promote the region as a pilot area within the European Union and worldwide in the field of cross-border risks prevention in maritime transport. This would provide the citizens of the European Union in general and particularly the people living by the Gulf of Finland comprehensive safety across their borders and enhance the mutual trust that is needed in developing the safety systems and procedures even further – eventually, towards a traffic control system with high-tech navigation surveillance qualities and traffic command powers delegated to traffic control operators. Gas Chapter V deals with another energy source, namely gas, and particularly the planned North European Gas Pipeline. The pipeline is to be one of the largest subsea gas pipeline projects in the world and is designed to provide European Union Member States with 55 bcm natural gas from Russia annually, which will be about 8% of the predicted total gas consumption in the European Union in 2015. The company Nord Stream, registered in Switzerland, has been established to implement the project, in cooperation with the Russian state-owned company Gazprom, which retains a 51% majority stake-holding in the enterprise, while German energy companies, added recently with a Dutch company, are minority shareholders. The North European Gas Pipeline is by definition a critical infrastructure, and perhaps also a ‘European’ critical infrastructure as it affects several Member States. The effects of a disruption are local and global. Local effects are gas leakages and a possible gas explosion at sea level. The global effects are possible turbulences in the gas supply and natural gas market, which could burden consumers to a certain extent. However, the probability of terrorist attacks or natural hazards that could damage or even disrupt the pipeline is rather low. Trawling and vessels anchoring near the pipeline strings pose more of a danger. A special issue is the chemical and conventional munitions dumped in the Baltic Sea. Experts suggest that building and operating the pipeline will not cause major risks of releasing chemical warfare agents or explosion of conventional munitions. Nevertheless, this cannot fully be excluded, even if extensive investigations are carried out prior to the laying and operation of the pipeline. The case study argues that a critical infrastructure protection strategy should be drafted for the pipeline, focusing on how to secure and to safeguard the pipeline mainly against technological hazards as trawling or anchoring ships and to have well coordinated and effective emergency response, including the fast detection and repair of damaged parts of the pipeline. Therefore, the case study authors propose, agreements between the operator Nord Stream and the affected Baltic Sea states have to be made. Since the safeguarding work and emergency response touches on the security interests of the states involved, there seems to be a need to develop institutional solutions at political level. Although the probability of attacks and natural disasters that could harm the North European Gas Pipeline is rather low, the effect of this could be substantial taken the importance of the pipeline and the side effects concerning dumped NORDREGIO REPORT 2007:5 XXV
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