Towards a Baltic Sea Region Strategy in Critical ... - Helsinki.fi

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CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION IN THE BALTIC SEA REGION Threats on the Underlying Information Infrastructure for CI The system monitoring, control and status data gathering in most CI are now automated processes with reduced reliance on human effort. These processes rely on SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) networks that enable communication with remote units using industrial protocols, such as, Modbus and PROFIBUS (Process Field Bus). Traditionally, SCADA networks have been considered to be closed networks and so security was not addressed in great depth compared to conventional ICT systems. However, recent trends have seen open standards and Internet technologies being increasingly adapted in SCADA networks. This is partly driven by the need to share up-to-date status data (e.g., with supply chain partners) and minimize expenditures by, for instance, reusing corporate network infrastructure and leased lines to implement parts of the SCADA network. Unfortunately, these measures provide direct or indirect connectivity points to the Internet and other public networks, creating a security gap that can end up compromising the systems controlled by the SCADA networks (Graham and Maynor 2006). Many examples exist of previous security breaches in SCADA networks. For instance, in March 2000, a disgruntled ex-employee in Australia repeatedly hacked into a sewerage management system releasing over a million litres of raw sewage into public places. And in January 2003, the Slammer worm disrupted SCADA traffic causing operators to temporarily lose some degree of control of the Davis-Besse nuclear power plant in Ohio USA. As a result, there is now increased acknowledgement of the possibility external attacks on SCADA networks by CI owners, and a notable surge in interest in SCADA systems by terrorists groups (Naedele 2007). Recent information security trends in the BSR Most of the nations of the Baltic Sea Region (BSR) epitomize what are known as information societies, and their achievements in this regard are routinely used as yardstick by other countries. This assertion is justified by the global rankings of various ICT indices (e.g., Knowledge Economy Index 61 , Networked Readiness Index 62 , ICT diffusion Index 63 etc.), where the BSR countries feature prominently in top tier of the rankings. Paradoxically, highly advanced information societies are usually left exposed to new kinds of vulnerabilities, as attested by the select examples below describing in brief some realized information security threats in the BSR. • Example 1: Users of Nordea’s personal Internet banking service in several countries in the BSR are regularly targeted by fraudulent phishing of that spam is now image-rich e-mail spam message (about three times the size of a text only e- mail spam), thus speeding up the exhaust of bandwidth and e-mail gateway capacities. 61 World Bank’s Knowledge Economy Index (KEI) evaluated based on variables representing conduciveness of economic and institutional regimes; educated and skilled population; efficiency of innovation environment; and use of ICTs. 62 World Economic Forum’s Networked Readiness Index (NRI) measures a country’s preparedness to exploit the opportunities offered by ICTs. 63 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development’s ICT diffusion index (ICTDI) measures a country’s penetration of ICTs (that is, mobile/fixed phones, Internet hosts and PCs) and it affordability. 98 NORDREGIO REPORT 2007:5
CHAPTER III: INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY attacks, luring them to disclose their bank codes. Earlier attacks in October 2005 forced the temporary closure of the service in Sweden and later actually succeeded, causing a reported loss of over €900,000 from user accounts as of January 2007 (Libbenga 2007). Most of the bank’s websites now post detailed customer advisory notes on how to deal with phishing attacks 64 . • Example 2: A malfunctioning of a 220 kV power transmission line in Uppsala 2 nd October 2002 caused outage in fixed and mobile communication networks in northern parts of Stockholm, Uppsala, Västerås, and so on. Consequently, the network failures triggered cascading failures affecting terrestrial television and radio broadcasts in some areas, the radar at Stockholm-Arlanda airport causing flight disruptions, and also rail system causing trains to run late (Eckström 2004). • Example 3: The Estonian government moved a Soviet war memorial statue from a central square in Tallin on 26 th April 2007. For the next three weeks, websites belonging to Estonian government departments (e.g., all ministries, except those of Culture and Agriculture) and businesses come under unusually intense but coordinated DDoS attacks. The Estonian authorities were then obliged to block overseas Internet connections to enable locals to continue accessing essential online services provided by key Estonian websites (Lesk 2007; Rantanen 2007). • Example 4: In August 2007, hackers infiltrated a database belonging to the telecom operator Tele2 and managed to steal details of 11-digit personal identification (ID) numbers and home addresses belonging to over 60,000 Norwegians.Among the victims is the head of the national data inspectorate, Datatilsynet. The stolen details put the victims under the serious threat of identity theft. The Norwegian police subsequently urged increased vigilance by the victims and are investigating the matter (Solberg 2007). A more general snapshot of a country’s overall information security trends is typically provided by national CERTs (Computer Emergency Response Teams) or CSIRTs (Computer Security and Incident response Teams). CERTs/CSIRTs offer a one-stop-shop service for reporting all security incidents (e.g. break-ins, DDoS attacks, new malware, discovered vulnerabilities etc.), publishing threat alerts and provisioning advisory services for a nation’s information security communities. Therefore, the statistics of security incidents compiled by a national CERT/CSIRT are usually quoted when analyzing information security trends for a particular country. For instance, the statistics obtained from the Finnish CERT (CERT-FI) indicate a sharp rise in reported security incidents since 2002 (see Figure 8). Notably, the number of reported incidents in the first half of 2007 already exceeds 64 See for example Nordea Finland (2007). NORDREGIO REPORT 2007:5 99
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Nordregio Report 2007:5 ISSN 1403-2
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5.4 Impacts caused by terrorism, na
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CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION
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PREFACE PREFACE With the Commission
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION CHAPTER I:
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CHAPTER V: GAS CHAPTER V: GAS Sven
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CHAPTER VI: WATER CHAPTER VI: WATER
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