Towards a Baltic Sea Region Strategy in Critical ... - Helsinki.fi

More documents

Recommendations

Info

CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION IN THE BALTIC SEA REGION government may find necessary to adopt. In practice, according to Hurley, this PPP in the development of CIP strategies can occur in at least the following ways: providing comments on government regulations published in proposed for; participating in the work of advisory committees to government agencies; serving on voluntary groups that research and draft publications germane to ITC issues; and participating as speakers or panellists in forums. The EU has clearly adopted the above-mentioned compromise, thus avoiding any far-reaching regulation of the private sector and confining to expressions such as ‘fully involving’ the private sector in EPCIP. The Directive Proposal of the EU Council 2006 stresses that: “Effective protection requires communication, coordination, and cooperation nationally and at EU level involving all relevant stakeholders. Full involvement of the private sector is important as most critical infrastructure is privately owned and operated. Each operator needs to control the management of their risks as it is normally the operator's sole decision which protection measures and business continuity plans to implement. Continuity planning should respect normal business processes and logic and where possible solutions should be based on standard commercial arrangements. Sectors possess particular experience, expertise and requirements concerning the protection of their critical infrastructure. Hence, in line with the responses to the EPCIP Green Paper the EU approach should fully involve the private sector, taking into account sector characteristics and should be built on existing sector-based protection measures.” (Commission 2006a, p. 3) In other contexts in the Directive Proposal, it is mentioned that the EU approach is supposed to “encourage full private sector involvement” (Commission 2006a, p.13). Thus, it seems to confirm Andersson and Malm’s (2006, p. 166-167) argument that PPP in its current form as structural cooperation between ‘equal parties’ is seen by both public and private actors as the most effective way to reach their goals. For government PPP provides means of engaging the private sector in public affairs and achieving guideline and standards without having to use strict regulatory means. For private actors PPP offers a flexible way of meeting government requirements while avoiding regulation. However, Andersson and Malm admit that there is evidence that there are gaps in deregulated sectors of CI, which cannot be covered by PPP. In the case studies of this volume, this problem is constantly noticed. Thus, Chapter II of this volume dealing with electricity blackouts notes that the “private sector, which is operating in the open market under hard competition, finds it difficult to invest more in preparedness than is economically justified.” Chapter IV, in turn, discussing maritime safety argues that the bottleneck at the moment is the low standard of equipment on vessels, such as a lack of e-navigation readiness. However, ship owners do not see the need for this equipment, “without an international obligation,” even if basically the question concerns relatively inexpensive investments. Yet the basic idea of PPP is probably well accepted in all BSR countries, though their different situations and conditions may give room for variances in the 38 NORDREGIO REPORT 2007:5
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION degree of regulation. Russia, for instance, is clearly more regulative in terms of its economic sectors, and although privatisation has been allowed in most economic areas within the framework of the Russian market economy, the Russian state has to be able to retain control over the key areas. For this reason the ‘sensitive’ fields remain difficult to open up to far reaching liberalisation or foreign ownership such that the strategic level of decision-making would move beyond the reach of the Russian state. (Liuhto 2007) Another extreme is perhaps Estonia, which is often said to have implemented its economic post-socialist reform in 1990s through ‘shock therapy’, and which was “partly accomplished through adopting legislation based on liberal or limited regulation of the economy, thus depriving the bureaucracy of opportunities to intervene or easily undermine the foundation of new companies” (Laar 2007). Indeed, in Estonia’s counter-terrorism strategy it is stated - with the hint that some new regulative or cooperative PPP efforts will be perhaps adopted – as follows: “Protection of critical infrastructures that are in the possession of legal entities under private law is not regulated by the state. It is necessary to define objects under high risk of attack and critical infrastructure at the state level and establish principles for organization of their protection.” (Fundamentals of Counterterrorism in Estonia 2006, article 3.6) Sweden, in turn, has been characterised by “a substantial amount of mixed ownership of […] critical infrastructures” and consequently a “great deal of government regulation has been accepted” (Lukasik et al. 2003, 79). These differences become important when forming CIP strategies in the region, as each country seems to need more or less tailored solutions to the exact forms of the PPP. 1.8 EU AND MEMBER STATES – FINDING THE RIGHT BALANCE As was seen above, the national models of CIP differ from that of the EPCIP at least in definitions and typologies but perhaps even in a more fundamental sense, such as whether the focus should be on protection or reliance/functionality, for instance. Several recent analyses of EPCIP, such as Fritzon et al. (2007, p. 39), have noted that there are actually “considerable uncertainties” in key areas of policy development and institutional design of the EPCIP and it in fact “is best described as a work in progress” and it is in fact “less a ‘program’ than a plan for a program.” Fritzon et al. criticize moreover that the EPCIP “although noble in intention, lacks a broad ‘vision’ or philosophy on addressing CIP.” While this might be too strong and unfair a statement – a lot of work and thought has indeed been put into the EPCIP – it is legitimate to raise the question of how to find the right balance between the broader national and more limited European definitions and efforts, and how to define the division of labour between different levels? NORDREGIO REPORT 2007:5 39
Page 1:
Towards a Baltic Sea Region Strateg
Page 4 and 5:
Nordregio Report 2007:5 ISSN 1403-2
Page 6 and 7:
5.4 Impacts caused by terrorism, na
Page 8 and 9:
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION
Page 11 and 12:
PREFACE PREFACE With the Commission
Page 13:
PREFACE The study includes tens of
Page 16 and 17:
Page 18 and 19:
Page 20 and 21:
Page 22 and 23:
Page 24 and 25:
Page 26 and 27: CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION
Page 39: CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION CHAPTER I:
Page 95 and 96: CHAPTER II: ELECTRICITY 2 ELECTRIC
Page 97 and 98: CHAPTER II: ELECTRICITY electricity
Page 99 and 100: CHAPTER II: ELECTRICITY Recent clim
Page 101 and 102: CHAPTER II: ELECTRICITY Figure II
Page 103 and 104: CHAPTER II: ELECTRICITY possibiliti
Page 105 and 106: CHAPTER II: ELECTRICITY continental
Page 107 and 108: CHAPTER II: ELECTRICITY Indirect Im
Page 109 and 110: CHAPTER II: ELECTRICITY fire depart
Page 111 and 112: CHAPTER II: ELECTRICITY • Local c
Page 113 and 114: CHAPTER II: ELECTRICITY these, syst
Page 115 and 116: CHAPTER II: ELECTRICITY • long in
Page 117 and 118: CHAPTER II: ELECTRICITY • The net
Page 119: CHAPTER II: ELECTRICITY centres etc
Page 123 and 124: CHAPTER III: INFORMATION AND COMMUN
Page 125 and 126: CHAPTER III: INFORMATION AND COMMUN
Page 127 and 128:
CHAPTER III: INFORMATION AND COMMUN
Page 129 and 130:
Page 131 and 132:
Page 133 and 134:
Page 135 and 136:
Page 137 and 138:
Page 139 and 140:
Page 141 and 142:
Page 143 and 144:
Page 145 and 146:
Page 147 and 148:
Page 149 and 150:
Page 151 and 152:
Page 153 and 154:
Page 155 and 156:
Page 157 and 158:
Page 159 and 160:
Page 161 and 162:
Page 163 and 164:
Page 165 and 166:
Page 167 and 168:
Page 169 and 170:
Page 171 and 172:
Page 173 and 174:
Page 175 and 176:
Page 177:
Page 181 and 182:
CHAPTER IV: OIL TRANSPORTATION AND
Page 183 and 184:
Page 185 and 186:
Page 187 and 188:
Page 189 and 190:
Page 191 and 192:
Page 193 and 194:
CHAPTER IV: OIL TRANSPORTATION ANDM
Page 195 and 196:
Page 197 and 198:
Page 199 and 200:
Page 201 and 202:
Page 203:
CHAPTER V: GAS CHAPTER V: GAS Sven
Page 206 and 207:
Page 208 and 209:
Page 210 and 211:
Page 212 and 213:
Page 214 and 215:
Page 216 and 217:
Page 218 and 219:
Page 220 and 221:
Page 222 and 223:
Page 225:
CHAPTER VI: WATER CHAPTER VI: WATER
Page 228 and 229:
Page 230 and 231:
Page 232 and 233:
Page 234 and 235:
Page 236 and 237:
Page 238 and 239:
Page 240 and 241:
Page 242 and 243:
Page 244 and 245:
Page 246 and 247:
Page 248 and 249:
Page 250 and 251:
Page 252 and 253:
Page 254 and 255:
Page 256 and 257:
Page 258 and 259:
Page 260 and 261:
Page 262 and 263:
Page 264 and 265:
Page 266 and 267:
Page 268 and 269:
Page 270 and 271:
Page 272 and 273:
Page 274 and 275:
Page 276:
show all

Towards a Baltic Sea Region Strategy in Critical ... - Helsinki.fi

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

Delete template?

Save as template?