Towards a Baltic Sea Region Strategy in Critical ... - Helsinki.fi

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CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION IN THE BALTIC SEA REGION failures, attacks or accidents above a defined minimum level of services and aim at minimising the recovery time and damage. CIIP should therefore be viewed as a cross-sector phenomenon rather than being limited to specific sectors. CIIP should be closely coordinated with Critical Infrastructure Protection from a holistic perspective.” (Commission 2005b) While ICT/CII can be vulnerable in a multitude of ways, as will be discussed in detail in Chapter III, in most connections when CII is discussed, it is connected to cyber attacks (see Wilson 2006), supposing that there are assailants attacking from a distance through virtual channels. The object of these cyber attacks is not necessarily CII but any CI. In several EU documents dealing with terrorism this perspective is raised. The issue becomes that of the consequences of this type of attack in terms of severity, such as loss of life. One Commission document states that the consequence of an attack on the industrial control systems of critical infrastructures could vary widely: “It is commonly assumed that a successful cyber attack would cause few, if any, casualties, but might result in loss of vital infrastructure service. For example, a successful cyber-attack on the public telephone switching might deprive customers of telephone service while technicians reset and repair the switching network. An attack on a chemical or liquid natural gas facility’s control systems might lead to more widespread loss of lives as well as significant physical damage.”(Commission 2004, p.3) Terrorism or all-hazards approach? The United States, NATO and EU approaches on CIP are clearly dominated by and closely connected to the threat of terrorism. In the CIP debates in the United States, the view that “We face a determined, intelligent enemy who seeks to cause us maximum harm” and therefore one should focus on worst-case analysis (Brown et al. 2006, p. 16), is clearly hegemonic. But, by way of refinement, it is useful to emphasise the different phases in the development of the CIP concept from this perspective. If one looks at the developments of the CIP in the United States, the emphasis early on was on deliberate threats (PCCIP 1996; cf. Abele-Wigert and Dunn 2006, pp. 26-27). It is true that the so-called all-hazards approach was accepted in United States’ emergency management planning as a ‘second priority’ (Guide for All-Hazards Emergency Operations Planning 1996) and the PCCIP in a way accepts the relevance of this approach by stating that “Each of the infrastructures is vulnerable in varying degrees to natural disasters, component failures, human negligence, and willful human misconduct” (PCCIP 1997, p. 27). However, the report states that “While poor design, accidents and natural disasters may threaten our infrastructures, we focused primarily on hostile attempts to damage, misuse, or otherwise subvert them.” (PCCIP 1997, p. 31) Naturally, after 9/11 the emphasis on deliberate attacks was hugely reinforced. The event gave reason to develop the “National Strategy for Homeland Security” (NSHS 2002), which defined three main strategic goals: to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America’s vulnerability to 28 NORDREGIO REPORT 2007:5
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION terrorism, and to minimize the damage and recover from attacks that may occur. Moreover, the main vulnerabilities and threats were now defined as chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons – i.e. physical rather than cyber attacks. This approach was later developed into the “National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets” (NSPPCI/KA 2003) 22 . But cyber threats were not forgotten either, as the “National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace” (NSSC 2003) was developed simultaneously. These strategies were clearly dominated by a threat picture connected to terrorism. The partial come-back of the all-hazards approach in the United States CIP strategy (or CI/KY protection) came only after Hurricane Katrina in 2005 shifted the focus somewhat away from the one-sided emphasis on terrorism. In fact, after this disaster it became popular to make all-hazards comparative vulnerability analyses of threats against CI, which clearly showed that large-scale natural catastrophes, especially hurricanes, take place relatively often in the United States causing a lot of more losses than terrorism (cf. Parfomak 2005, p. 11). Thus in the current strategy of the United States formulated in 2006 the allhazards approach is back, although the threat of terrorism still dominates: “In addition to addressing CI/KR protection related to terrorist threats, the NIPP [National Infrastructure Protection Plan] also describes activities relevant to CI/KR protection and preparedness in an allhazards context” (NIPP 2006, p. 11). The reference points are the “direct impacts, disruptions, and cascading effects of natural disasters (e.g., Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the Northridge earthquake, etc.) and manmade incidents (e.g., the Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Plant accident or the Exxon Valdez oil spill) on the Nation’s CI/KR” (NIPP 2006, p. 11). Also NATO’s focus in CIP is on “ways to assist nations in improving their preparedness for the protection of civilian populations from terrorist attacks against critical infrastructure” (Abele-Wigert and Dunn 2006, p. 363). If we look at the threat pictures of the European Union, it seems clear that terrorism, especially the Madrid 2004 bomb attacks, was the catalyst for launching the EPCIP in the first place. That is why in the Commission the development and coordination of the EPCIP became located in the DG Justice, Freedom and Security, which takes care of police affairs, terrorism and the like, instead of, say, the DG Environment/Civil Protection Unit. However, when in November 2005 the Commission published the “Green Paper on a European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection” to be discussed by the stakeholders in the Member States, it gave three options concerning the threats: an all-hazards approach for everything; an all-hazards approach with a terrorism priority; a terrorism hazards approach (Commission 2005b, p. 3). If one then looks at the Commission’s “Proposal for a Directive of the Council on the identification and designation of European Critical Infrastructure and the Assessment of the Need to Improve their Protection” (Commission 2006a) 22 For an analytic review, cf. Moteff and Parfumak (2004). NORDREGIO REPORT 2007:5 29
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CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION
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CHAPTER VI: WATER CHAPTER VI: WATER
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