Interim Report - Introduction - EASA
Interim Report - Introduction - EASA
Interim Report - Introduction - EASA
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INTERIM REPORT – OPTIONS FOR CHANGE<br />
<strong>EASA</strong>.2009.OP.21<br />
this itself satisfies their responsibility for assuring that the data is accurate. <strong>EASA</strong> issues the<br />
LoA to appropriate suppliers who meet the criteria; this is accomplished in accordance with<br />
<strong>EASA</strong> Opinion 01/2005. Operators can still obtain databases from suppliers who do not hold<br />
a LoA, but they then have to demonstrate to the Authority that their procedures are adequate<br />
to assure the same standards. In both cases, the operator’s Quality System still needs to be<br />
employed. One of the aims of the LoA is to ease the obligation on operators to perform what<br />
would be nearly impossible and unimplementable controls and processes.<br />
The option of <strong>EASA</strong> issuing LoAs to service providers of de-icing / anti-icing would introduce<br />
different challenges. First there are only a few air navigation database suppliers, therefore<br />
the Agency’s commitment of resources is limited. Secondly, if <strong>EASA</strong> did audit every de-icing<br />
/ anti-icing service provider, this is only a process that operator’s are obliged to do anyway;<br />
therefore, the duplication would be wasted effort, and to against whose standard would the<br />
Agency be conducting audits – each individual operator’s? The benefit of using an LoA<br />
process is that standard “conditions and guidance” can be established against which audits<br />
and inspections can take place.<br />
In <strong>EASA</strong> Opinion 01/2005, the Agency has the view that the best solution would certainly be<br />
that the industry organizes itself to verify the quality of the navigation data provided by the<br />
suppliers and used by the aircraft operators. Such an option, similar to that developed by<br />
IATA for the operational safety audit of its member airlines (IOSA). This view points towards<br />
a possible hybrid system of regulation and oversight. The IATA DAQCP provides a model<br />
where member airlines agree a common standard audit checklist (based on AEA<br />
Recommendations), and accept the audit results of shared audits within the pool of<br />
members. The auditors are provided by the pool members and are trained in accordance<br />
with the DAQCP’s own accepted standards. In effect, any service provider passing a<br />
DAQCP audit is issued with an Industry seal of approval, much like IOSA, whilst not<br />
removing the ultimate responsibility from the operator. It could be conceivable that any<br />
organisation (like IATA) wishing to establish a de-icing / anti-icing quality control pool can be<br />
“approved” or “accepted” by <strong>EASA</strong> and issued with their own LoA (perhaps LoA1); this would<br />
then permit the pool’s own qualified auditors to issue, on behalf of the Agency, LoAs<br />
(perhaps LoA2) to service providers who meet the necessary standards. Currently, the<br />
DAQCP is established from the perspective of their own airline membership, and this limits<br />
the number of destinations and service providers included in the scheme. An improvement<br />
to the scheme would be to allow service provider membership where they either paid for the<br />
privilege of being audited and thereby “accepted”, or they paid a fee and contributed to the<br />
pool of auditors.<br />
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