Interim Report - Introduction - EASA
Interim Report - Introduction - EASA
Interim Report - Introduction - EASA
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INTERIM REPORT – OPTIONS FOR CHANGE – ATTACHMENT A<br />
<strong>EASA</strong>.2009.OP.21<br />
3.5 Flight Safety Foundation (FSF) Air Safety Network – Summary<br />
of Accident <strong>Report</strong> 1980 – 2009<br />
A search was made of this publicly available database for accidents connected with de-icing /<br />
anti-icing of aircraft on the ground between 1980 and 2009.<br />
It must be noted that during this time, although awareness of the dangers to flight with<br />
contaminated aircraft surfaces had increased, the spread of accidents included in the results<br />
was unchanged:<br />
− 1980 – 89: 13 events<br />
− 1990 – 99: 13 events<br />
− 2000 – 09: 12 events<br />
Also note that many of the accident aircraft were types not necessarily associated with<br />
commercial air transport in Europe today; however, the results do show that if procedures<br />
are inadequate, or not followed, and aircraft depart with contaminated surfaces, then the risk<br />
of an accident is extremely high.<br />
In the search of the FSF database, 38 accident reports were identified. Of these, the<br />
probable cause quoted was the failure to de-ice in 28 cases (74%), although failure to de-ice<br />
was evident in 36 cases (95%).<br />
Contributing factors are quoted below:<br />
− 10 (26%) failure to inspect, or inadequate inspection,<br />
− 9 (24%) inappropriate procedures and/or supporting regulations,<br />
− 9 (24%) lack of awareness by pilots, and<br />
− 8 (21%) failure to de-ice (only contributing because other factors were involved such<br />
as overweight take-off).<br />
3.6 Confidential Human Factors Incident <strong>Report</strong>ing Programme<br />
(UK)<br />
A search of the CHIRP database was requested for de-icing / anti-icing related events.<br />
10 reports were recovered, spanning January 2004 to October 2010.<br />
Of these, 5 were reported by flight-crew and 5 by cabin-crew.<br />
This is a surprisingly low number of reports, bearing in mind that CHIRP is a confidential<br />
repository. One explanation for this might be that there is growing confidence in the<br />
effectiveness of in-house company confidential reporting systems, which are very effective<br />
and trusted these days, and therefore CHIRP is probably used less often. Nothing<br />
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