Dialogue in and between Different Cultures - International ...
Dialogue in and between Different Cultures - International ...
Dialogue in and between Different Cultures - International ...
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Politeness <strong>and</strong> Social Dynamics <strong>in</strong> the Chat Communication 117<br />
(Im)politeness, on the contrary, is a salient communicative behaviour, i.e. a<br />
behaviour that exceeds what participants perceive to be appropriate to the ongo<strong>in</strong>g<br />
social <strong>in</strong>teraction. It represents “any l<strong>in</strong>guistic behaviour which goes beyond the<br />
bounds of politic behaviour [<strong>and</strong>] is open to potential classification as ‘polite’,<br />
which <strong>in</strong>cludes potential irony, aggressiveness, abuse, etc” (Watts 2003:161).<br />
But how do participants recognize or have knowledge about the appropriate<br />
behaviour (politic behaviour) <strong>in</strong> the ongo<strong>in</strong>g social <strong>in</strong>teraction? How do they<br />
know when the use of some communicative strategies <strong>and</strong> l<strong>in</strong>guistic structures<br />
exceeds what is expected <strong>and</strong> represents a salient communicative behaviour? I<br />
will firstly attempt to answer both questions through some of the social<br />
phenomenological considerations developed by Schütz & Luckmann (1994a/b).<br />
3.1 World knowledge, politic behaviour <strong>and</strong> communication as an <strong>in</strong>tersubjecttive<br />
activity<br />
Our world knowledge is ga<strong>in</strong>ed trough social <strong>in</strong>teraction. This knowledge consists<br />
of experiences which are to a higher or lower degree typified. Trough these<br />
experiences, the <strong>in</strong>dividual orients herself <strong>in</strong> her social environment (cf. Schütz &<br />
Luckmann 1994a:29). They can be exam<strong>in</strong>ed or modified dur<strong>in</strong>g the ongo<strong>in</strong>g<br />
social <strong>in</strong>teraction. In this way, the <strong>in</strong>dividual acquires new experiences which are<br />
aga<strong>in</strong> typified <strong>and</strong> serve to <strong>in</strong>terpret later communicative situations. These<br />
typified experiences facilitate relative stable <strong>in</strong>teraction practices (cf. Toph<strong>in</strong>ke<br />
2001:44), the construction of a particular social reality <strong>and</strong> the ma<strong>in</strong>tenance of a<br />
specific ritual order. Such typified experiences represent a certa<strong>in</strong> type of an<br />
acquired world knowledge, which can be designated as cognitive schemata.<br />
Typified personal experiences turn <strong>in</strong>to acts, when the <strong>in</strong>dividual connects<br />
them with a specific motivation or purpose (cf. Schütz & Luckmann 1994a:<br />
253ff). However, an <strong>in</strong>dividual has access only to her own personal experiences.<br />
In order to identify <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>terpret such experiences as acts by other participants,<br />
the <strong>in</strong>dividual shows a correlation <strong>between</strong> the utterance <strong>and</strong> a determ<strong>in</strong>ed<br />
l<strong>in</strong>guistic behaviour. That behaviour is provided with some <strong>in</strong>dicators or contextualization<br />
cues (cf. Gumperz 2001:221), by means of which participants can<br />
recognize <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>terpret the mean<strong>in</strong>g of the utterance, accord<strong>in</strong>g to their own<br />
typified experiences <strong>and</strong> the cognitive schemata related with those experiences. In<br />
the same way, the <strong>in</strong>dividual <strong>in</strong>terprets the mean<strong>in</strong>g of other participants’<br />
utterances trough their l<strong>in</strong>guistic behaviour, the contextualization cues shown <strong>in</strong><br />
that behaviour <strong>and</strong> the <strong>in</strong>dividual’s own typified experiences <strong>and</strong> cognitive<br />
schemata. The mean<strong>in</strong>g of an utterance is consequently not self-determ<strong>in</strong>ed by the<br />
<strong>in</strong>dividual but by the others (cf. Schütz & Luckmann 1994b:18). The social reality<br />
is thus constructed <strong>in</strong> an <strong>in</strong>tersubjective way <strong>and</strong> not exclusively <strong>in</strong> a subjective or<br />
rational manner.<br />
The <strong>in</strong>dividual’s cognitive schemata are determ<strong>in</strong>ant <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>terpret<strong>in</strong>g other<br />
participants’ l<strong>in</strong>guistic behaviour as (<strong>in</strong>)appropriate <strong>in</strong> the context of the ongo<strong>in</strong>g<br />
social <strong>in</strong>teraction. The correspondence of this l<strong>in</strong>guistic behaviour with the