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10 kris och lärdom
ers feel outdated and inadequate, a view that is often
expressed in localities that have recently experienced
a larger disaster. In cases where the plans are considered
less relevant, they have also been used flexibly,
which explains why they were still considered to be
functional. One of the municipalities did not have an
(established) plan during the tsunami or the storm.
This caused disagreement and problems for both the
command process and the communications response,
but whether this was due to the lack of a plan is an
open question.
Several municipalities say they hold regular exercises
– once a year or every second year – with different
disaster scenarios. Most disaster professionals
agree on the importance of exercises that improve
conditions for responding to future disasters. At the
same time they reflect upon the fact that real disasters
are never represented in exercises. Each disaster is
unique, they say somewhat clichéd, with reference to
the fact that all disasters are different in terms of their
physical impact and process. On the other hand, this
study shows that there are major similarities between
different disasters in terms of disaster response forms
and how they are structured, forms of operation and
communication.
Response to a serious social disruption is created
when a command function is established, normally
in the form of a municipal command group or staff
(usually located in the rescue services facilities). Depending
on the nature and scope of the disaster, external
functions are contacted – the armed forces, the
home guard and voluntary organisations. A broad
network is established at local level for/by the operational
response but also with regional and national
parties with the purpose of sharing information and
other functions.
A disaster response committee was created in some
places during the tsunami and storm disasters, but
political control via committees or chairmanship was
usually preferred. Views of the system with a disaster
response committee are clearly divided between advocates
and opponents. At the same time, it can be
noted that the highest municipal management (municipal
commissioner) is usually incorporated into the
staff and more or less works actively. The involvement
of political management in the staff is considered by
both politicians and officials as rational and effective
for decision-making purposes. Not all staff members
are positive towards the active role that politicians
play in operational work, however.
For the actual events in this study, actors in most
places indicate how the disaster response function has
been established consciously, with confidence and authority;
one response manager describes how they are
confident and determined in their leadership and direction
of the operational response. This applies whenever
municipalities have experienced and handled
previous disasters. The disaster response is strengthened
by actors who have taken part in similar extreme
events before (see below).
Crisis communications
This study shows how the significance of communication
in community organizations is accentuated
during disasters, in line with previous knowledge. The
reinforced position of the communicative dimension
appears in several ways. Firstly, the response organisation
generally believes that it holds an informing and
communicating role. The disaster professional’s role
here includes communicating with both the media and
other groups; a secretive attitude is rarely observed
except for some minor exceptions.
The increased significance of communication is due
to several factors: the realisation that effective and
close communication is crucial to successful disaster
response, and that the need and demand for information
grows. Just as we expected, the interviewed disas-