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local elements and content rather than separating the
political, operational and communication functions.
And foremost a general understanding of the significance
of communication, i.e. the importance of investing
in broad-based communication initiatives during
disasters, in the acute phase specifically but also throughout
the entire disaster response process. Communication
is half the job, claim several experienced
staff and rescue operation managers.
The likelihood of assimilating historical knowledge
is reasonably good the closer in time to the previous
event and the more personal experience one has, in line
with the thesis of Brändström, Bynander & ’t Hart
(2004). The same applies if the organizational conditions
are similar. This study concludes however those
individuals who have taken part in previous response
operations have consistently detailed and clear memories
and experiential perceptions regardless of the
time lapse. These events and response operations are
pregnant memory elements. Dissimilar organizational
solutions do not necessarily impair the conditions for
assimilating historical knowledge if we are to interpret
their reports of previous and relevant response operations
correctly.
We can note a slightly pleasant but hardly surprising
conclusion that disasters are good (to have experienced).
A general reflection of the interviewed disaster
professionals in this study is that during the actual
disasters – the tsunami and the storm – they benefited
from their experience of previous disaster response
work. Their experiences gave them an inner security
and knowledge that they had handled an extreme
event before, which created a (feeling of) capacity to
deal with this kind of work again. Previous knowledge
has been cognitively processed and recreated. Knowledge
transfer thus appears to be a central concept in
disaster response.
For the disaster professionals who have taken part
in both “old” and new extreme events, we can speak
about first and second degrees of experience and lessons
learned. Compared with theories of single and
double loop learning in organization research, learning
from previous disasters deals to a large extent
with the first type, but in some cases where systems
and structures have been changed/extended we could
possibly also speak about double-loop learning.
A number of interviewed disaster professionals
have held their positions for a long time and during
that time experienced one or more extreme events.
Their personal experience can be considered advantageous
for local disaster work in the event of a new
incident. But at the same time, this can be problematic
when people retire or leave and are replaced by new
employees. This is accentuated by the fact that local
authorities do not always collate evaluations of their
disaster response activities as a basis for managing
new and serious social disruptions. Disaster management
training can compensate, but recruitment in the
disaster management area may could an embarrassing
chapter for local authorities.
This study can hardly assess whether there are
any differences in disaster response capabilities between
municipalities with a disaster experience and
municipalities without (the latter are too few). One
indication in this direction, however, is that defective
communication work was observed in the municipality
that did not have an (established) disaster and
communication plan and that showed varying perceptions
of how a plan of this nature should take form.
In one of the municipalities that had not experienced
previous disasters, the response to the January storm
was implemented in a manner that could warrant a
discussion.
Some international research claims that analyses
and experience of disaster response work rarely lead
to changes in organisational and response forms, especially
when these experiences have been problematic
and negative. Lessons are not learned from the expe-